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The Arab Spring and Democratization Theory: 
The Case of Egypt 
 
 
Abir Kashouh 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
For some time now scholars have debated the resilience of authoritarianism in the 
Middle East. Arab states used a mix of strategies to retain control, thus appearing to 
escape the “third wave of democratization” identified by Samuel Huntington. The 
Arab Spring ended this assumption, however, as new hope for democratization 
emerged in the region. This thesis tests some of the arguments made by the 
comparative politics literature on authoritarian regime breakdown against the 
Egyptian experience with regime transition. It does so by using the independent 
variables explaining authoritarian regime breakdown identified by Barbara Geddes 
and Valerie Bunce. The thesis traces the trajectory of regime consolidation and, 
subsequently, breakdown in Egypt. In so doing, it underlines the differences and 
similarities with other comparative cases of authoritarian regime breakdown. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 	  
1.1- Introduction 	  
For some time now scholars have debated the resilience of authoritarianism 
in the Middle East. Arab States used rent and a mix of other strategies to retain 
control, and were able to suppress any democratic initiative. Consequently, the 
region managed to escape the “third wave of democratization” identified by Samuel 
Huntington, or so it seemed.  
The first wave of democratization began with the American Revolution of 
1776 followed by the French Revolution of 1789.  The Second Wave started with the 
victory of the Allies in the World War II. The Third Wave became more global, 
originating with the sudden fall of the military regime in Portugal in 1974. The Third 
Wave spread to Latin America, Asia, Central Europe and Africa. The countries 
involved successfully witnessed democratic transitions. However, this wave missed 
the Middle East. 
According to the Economic Intelligence Report (2008) and Freedom House 
(2010), there was a decline in democracy in recent years. Reports described the 
Middle East as “the most repressive region in the world” (Pomed, 2010).  Rising and 
leading authoritarian powers such as Russia, Iran, Venezuela and China were also 
contributing to a decline in democracy. Leading democracies such as the United 
States and the European Union faced a sense of fatigue especially after the severe 
impact of the 2008 global economic crisis. According to Freedom House (2010), 
these last ten years present a huge decline in the number of democracies. The total 
number of electoral democracies declined to reach 115, the lowest number since 
1995.  
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Yet as democracy was waning in places like Belarus and Venezuela, the 
Jasmine Revolution of Tunisia brought hope of a new wave of democratization. 
(Gershman, 2011). The Arab Spring started. Will this extend democracy’s scope into 
the region that most resisted democratic transitions?  
Kifaya movement , cedar revolutions ? 
 The transitions began with the uprisings in Tunisia in December 2010. The 
waves that passed through Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin American left the Arab 
Middle East behind. 2011 presented new developments and new challenges. People 
witnessed a series of uprisings and revolutions, comparable to the revolutions of 
1989.  Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street merchant, set himself on fire in front 
of a government building. This act of self-immolation triggered unrest and mass 
mobilization in Tunis. The apparently stable Tunisian regime turned unable to face 
popular challenges. The uprising resulted ultimately in the resignation of President 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Along with Tunisia, Egypt witnessed a change too. 
Egyptian anti-government protesters fought peacefully in Tahrir Square calling for 
the resignation of Hosni Mubarak.  
The Arab Middle East, which was bypassed by the third wave of democracy, 
surprised the world in 2011. Ironically, just before the Tunisian uprisings, the 
Economist magazine (2010) published an article summarizing the various arguments 
making democracy an impossible phenomenon in the region. Authoritarian regimes 
are subject to Islamic culture, colonial borders, corruption, Islamists, and the 
abundance of oil. All of those arguments were suddenly refuted by millions of Arabs, 
sending a message that they also want and can have democracy.  
A change in one country had an impact on what had appeared as stable 
autocracies in other parts of the Arab World. Something broke up and the Arab 
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people started to ask for change. The standard cause of this situation was the liberal 
democratic discontent. Masses demanded liberal democratic reform and yearned for 
sweeping political change and social justice.  
Since 2010, three kinds of uprisings have been witnessed in the Arab World. 
The first type of movements was found to be ineffective as in Morocco and Bahrain.  
The second involved incremental regime change as in Egypt and Tunis. Finally, the 
third kind involved a slide to civil war in Syria, Libya and Yemen (Friedman, 2011).  
Numerous ‘days of rage’ spread to different Arab countries; Algeria, 
Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, Iran, Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen. Influenced by the Jasmine 
revolution, people expressed their frustration and political and economic grievances. 
 However, some regimes managed to retain control over their societies as in 
the Gulf countries.  
Can we thus speak about a process of democratization in the Arab World? It 
may still be too early to judge this but the curtain of fear was torn apart and a new 
hope for freedom was established.  
1.2- Democratization in Context 	  
 Although the literature about authoritarianism in the Middle East is vast, all 
of it used to examine the absence of democracy in the region. In the early 1950s and 
1960s, the prevalence of authoritarianism did not distinguish the region specifically 
from other third world countries. The Middle East missed the third wave of 
democratization that spread from Latin America in the 1970s to other Third World 
countries and to Eastern Europe in 1980s.  Every attempt at political liberalization 
stalled or was reversed. In the Arab Middle East, Turkey and Lebanon were seen 
differently. In those two countries, the authoritarian or civil war period was followed 
by contested elections resulting in a strict domination of elites (Posusney, 2005).  
	  
 
 4	  
 The Middle East is not the only region suffering from authoritarianism, but 
this region is different since it endured such a long form of authoritarianism. It was 
vacant of any prior attempts of democratization. Policy makers and academic 
scholars offered pronouncements, papers, studies, and research to explain the cause 
of this democracy deficit. They shared different perspectives to explain the resilience 
of many authoritarian regimes and the factors hindering democratization. However, 
very few seemed to believe that an authoritarian Middle East could undergo a 
transition to democracy.  
 The literature changed in 2011. The Jasmine Revolution ended the era where 
this region was labeled not open to democracy. Arab countries saw hope in the 
streets of Tunisia. This resulted in mass movements across Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, 
Yemen and Syria. Numerous authors began studying the transition and the revolution 
of the Arab world. The Arab uprisings are indeed movements of huge historical 
significance. But while many study the transition on the ground, this thesis examines 
a specific phenomenon: authoritarian regime breakdown in Egypt. 
The process of democratization is a topic of great importance. At first, 
democracies in the world were the exceptions. However, today, after numerous 
waves of democratization in Latin America, Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, 
democracy has become a global norm. Valerie Bunce (2000) suggests that the 
process of authoritarian regime breakdown requires certain variables. She focuses on 
the quality and sustainability of democracies and the path to authoritarianism regime 
breakdown. Bunce (2000) argues that all new democracies face problems as they 
break away from authoritarianism, and as they build subsequent democratic 
institutions. Barbara Geddes’s (1999) theoretical study also presents a set of 
variables that are necessary for regime breakdown.  
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Democratization and regime breakdown are complex dynamics that defy 
universally agreed upon definitions. Thus, the first part of the study will focus on 
establishing the definitions and characteristics attendant to this political concept. 
Then, it will map the variables of democratization and will test them against the case 
of Egypt.  The thesis will explore the conditions that provided the impetus for the 
uprisings and the transition process in Egypt.  
 
1.3- Research Questions 	  
What are the prerequisites for authoritarian breakdown as identified by Bunce 
and Geddes? Authors have identified three waves of democratization and yet the 
Middle East missed all of them. In particular, this thesis tests the arguments made by 
Geddes and Bunce against the case of authoritarian regime breakdown in Egypt.  
 Bunce studies the relationship between different variables to understand the 
dynamics of authoritarian regime breakdown. She bases her arguments on a number 
of variables; the economic development, elites and origins of democracy, elites and 
the course of democratization, institutional design, the nation and the state, and 
finally, formal institutions and informal practices. Studying new democracies also 
requires looking at the regional transition. New democracies are challenged by three 
factors: breaking up with authoritarian rule, building the desired democratic 
establishments, and creating new ways to be able to cooperate with the former 
authoritarian regime (Bunce, 2000).  
 Barbara Geddes also studied regime breakdown but highlighted other factors. 
She studied poverty, poor economic performance, and splits in the system, popular 
protest, pacts between elites, and exogenous shocks. According to Geddes, those 
factors are essential for regime breakdown.  
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 What explains the breakdown of authoritarianism, particularly in Egypt? Do 
the independent variables identified by Geddes and Bunce explain authoritarian 
regime breakdown in Egypt? This question will be answered by analyzing the 
reasons behind the uprisings, and then comparing them to the variables identified by 
Bunce and Geddes. 
1.4- Methodology  	  
 Egypt’s case is important because it is at the heart of the Arab World, which 
gives it outstanding influence in the region, especially after the Camp David Accord. 
The combination of its large population of 80 million and its strategic location and 
trade routes, Egypt plays an important role. After the 1950s, this country was marked 
by a significant continuity in the internal scene. After 29 years in power, on the 11th 
of February, President Hosni Mubarak resigned. Popular uprisings took place in the 
streets of Suez, Cairo, and Alexandria against the authoritarian regime. In the last 
couple of years, the public sector was unresponsive to the people’s needs, and the 
government failed to provide sufficient employment opportunities and economic 
growth (Sharp, 2011). Egyptian uprisings highlighted the political and economic 
grievances addressing the problems of corruption and injustice.  The success of 
Mubarak’s removal was the unpredicted result of a coalition of interests, class and 
ideologies.   
This thesis uses the comparative approach to explain authoritarian regime 
breakdown in the Arab World, but more particularly in Egypt. We will compare the 
variables identified by theoretical studies of regime breakdown to process of regime 
breakdown in Egypt. Moreover, this thesis uses secondary data, such as books, 
academic journals, etc. to test the Egyptian case against the arguments presented by 
Geddes and Bunce. To study the causal factors of the Arab Spring and the situation 
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in Egypt today, one must also use primary sources such as newspapers. 
Unfortunately, the research will encounter some limitations since the topic is very 
fresh and the outcome is still gray. In addition, some of the analysis will be based on 
speculations and forecasting about the future of the uprising.  
1.5- Map of The Thesis  	  
 The thesis consists of four chapters. The next chapter is a heuristic exercise 
meant to achieve two things. First, it identifies the arguments made to explain 
authoritarian regime maintenance in the Arab World. Second, it spells out the 
independent variables identified in the theoretical literature for authoritarian regime 
breakdown. These variables are taken from two theoretical studies made by Geddes 
and Bunce. Chapter three examines the dynamics of the Egyptian history since 1952 
and the authoritarian nature. It also highlights the last ten years under Mubarak. 
Chapter four tests the variables of Geddes and Bunce in light of the Egyptian 
uprising. Finally, chapter five includes a summary of the main arguments and an 
analysis of its theoretical contributions. 	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CHAPTER TWO 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 	  
2.1- Introduction  	  
Since the 1950s, the Middle East was part of the scholarly study of the 
challenges of political development. Egypt, Syria and Iraq were used as case studies 
to explain military coups. The Middle East was also included in early studies of 
nationalism and postcolonial state building when Jamal Abdel Nasser participated in 
the founding the Non-Aligned Movement. Later on, the region was marginalized in 
the study of developing countries after escaping the third wave of democratization. 
Middle Eastern cases were completely absent from the most important works on 
democratic transitions. The region was  rather best known for its ‘stubborn 
authoritarianism’.   
The Arab uprisings pose a grave challenge to core findings in the literature 
on authoritarianism in the Arab world. The Arab Spring questioned the academic 
literature on authoritarian persistence and challenged a large number of scholarly 
‘clichés’. Scholars failed to predict the recent developments that took place in the 
Arab world. Miriam Elman (2011) suggests that experts could not anticipate what 
happened in the Arab Spring for two reasons.  The first reason is that no scholar 
has covered a particular dynamic in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
The democratic deficit literature discussed the region as a whole.  This 
interpretation drove researchers to avoid the real elements of change. The other 
reason is rationalism. The literature also missed strategic interaction and emotive 
behavior. Elman argues that the field did not use cost benefit analysis to explain 
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for example why the army sided with the Egyptian opposition in Tahrir Square 
(Elman, 2011: p.98-99). 
This chapter aims to rectify this gap in the literature on authoritarian regime 
breakdown. Specifically, it studies the events that happened in Egypt in lieu of 
previous explanations of authoritarian regime breakdown.  
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part reviews the literature 
explaining authoritarian endurance in the Arab world. The second part firstly 
identifies authoritarian regime breakdown and then the variables that explain the 
phenomenon as identified in the comparative politics literature.  
2.2 - Authoritarian Endurance in the Arab World 	  
 Authors of the democratization literature tend to explain the endurance of 
authoritarianism in the Middle East using two main approaches. One approach 
focuses on prerequisites; whether economic, cultural or institutional. The second 
approach explains democratization as dependent on the choices of a regime and 
opposition actors. The literature chosen investigates important past propositions 
covering the two schools of thought.  
 
2.2.1- Cultural Perspective 
Hisham Sharabi (1998) postulates that Arab authoritarianism is due in part 
to the tribal Arab patriarchal mentality. The latter works as an obstacle for the 
advance of pluralist ideals. Arab societies are thus inclined to accept the so-called 
patrimonial leader (Sharabi, 1998). Moreover, and although they do not present 
strictly cultural arguments, Rustow (1970, p.350-351) and Horowitz (1993) both 
argue that national unity is a prerequisite for democratization. Marcha Posusney 
(2005) gives the example of Iraq; the United States failed in its mission because 
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sectarianism acts an impediment to democratization throughout the Middle East. 
Michael Herb (1999) also stresses the importance of sectarian divisions. The latter 
successfully managed to strengthen the deep roots of authoritarianism.  
Michael Hudson (1995), Lisa Wedeen (1998), and Amaney Jamal (2007) 
use anti-orientalist cultural arguments to explain the persistence of 
authoritarianism in the Middle East. Hudson highlights the need to be aware of 
the role of political culture in Arab politics. He proposed that tensions do exist 
between democratic values and the Islamic religion. Lisa Wedeen (1998) studied 
obedience, which induces complicity. The Hafiz Al-Assad regime in Syria 
created a personality cult in order to build an effective state. Wedeen (1998) 
highlights the enforcement of political dominance and national membership. 
Syrians are provided with a coherent system of rules, norms, prohibitions, and 
constraints to regulate their public conduct. The Assad’s regime was capable of 
creating, through political culture, a sub-system of coercive control that 
contributes to the regime’s longevity. 
Amaney Jamal (2007) focuses on the subject of generalized trust serving 
democracy in democratic settings. She concludes that generalized trust is not 
linked to democratic forms of political and social engagement in the Arab World. 
After studying the level of trust in the Arab world, Jamal witnessed a growing 
discontent with the existing political and social status quo. Lower levels of trust 
are seen as also conductive to a democratic political culture.  
2.2.2- Economic Perspective 	  
Some academic scholars, such as Eva Bellin (2004), Marsha Posusney 
(2005), Seymour Lipset (1960) and Arang Keshavarzian (2004) explain 
authoritarianism in the Middle East as a result of economic factors. The Gulf 
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States derive the most significant part of their income from hydrocarbon exports: 
oil and gas. However, the poorer neighbors are also affected by the Arab oil 
economy. Those countries rely on labor migration and foreign aid. Thus the 
whole composite situation makes the Arab countries rentier or semi-rentier states. 
Other than patronage, the Middle Eastern regimes lack the main engine of 
democratization: a tax burden. Posusney (2005) argues that the lack of a tax 
burden deprives citizens from their right to participate in the government. 
Seymour Lipset (2006) also supports the argument behind “no representation 
without taxation”.  
Arang Keshavarzian (2004) uses the rentier state theory to explain the 
resilience of the Iranian regime, which lacks an institutionalized and deep-rooted 
political organization. Although prices fluctuated during the last years, the 
Iranian regime was utterly dependent on rents. The latter helped give the elite 
more access to patronage. Rents primarily financed the regime’s coercive 
agencies and led to major elite fragmentation and factionalism. Keshavarzian 
also stresses the opposition parties’ inability to mobilize supporters among the 
citizenry. 
In addition, Eva Bellin (2004) argues that in the Arab World rentier income 
is the major contributor to the robustness of authoritarianism. The highest 
proportion of expenditures is devoted to security forces.  
Explanations for the robustness of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East 
and North Africa have so far focused on the absent prerequisites of 
democratization in the region, including a weak civil society, state-dominated 
economies, poor socioeconomic performance, and a nondemocratic culture. In 
contrast, the region's enduring authoritarianism can be directly linked to the 
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robustness of the coercive apparatus in the region and to this apparatus' 
exceptional will and capacity to crush democratic initiatives. Cross-regional 
comparison by Bellin highlights external and internal factors that account for this 
exceptional strength. 
2.2.3- Institutional and Political Economic Perspective 	  
Mehram Kamrava (2007), Steven Heydemann (2007), Ellen Lust (2009) 
and Larry Diamond (2010) link the robustness of authoritarianism in the Arab 
World to institutional and political economic explanations. Steven Heydemann 
(2007) studied the resilience of Arab regimes. He argues that authoritarian rule 
provides the regime with a healthy access to opportunities and strategies in order 
to secure its interests. The unique national populist social pacts of authoritarian 
regimes help them protect themselves from democratization.  
Larry Diamond (2010) sees the Middle East as an exception. In his article 
“Why is there no Arab democracy?” , he rejects the religious, economic, and cultural 
reasons as valid explanations of persistent authoritarianism. According to Diamond, 
political economy and geopolitics are the reasons behind the democratic deficit in the 
region. He suggests that oil plays an important role in authoritarian regimes’ 
maintenance. After all, none of the twenty-three countries exporting oil are 
democracies today. 
Mehram Kamrava (2007) looks at institutional viability and rule. He argues 
that civil society plays an important role in democratization. In the Arab region, this 
condition is absent. He suggested that democratic transitions are not possible unless a 
pact occurs between the incumbents and the elites (Kamrava, 2007).  But what will 
happen if civil society is active but tends to be extremist and undemocratic?  
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On the other hand, Daniel Brumberg (2003) suggests that Arabs can reach a 
transition to a “liberalized autocracy” but not to democracy. The author looks at the 
level of political pluralism leading to a liberalized form of autocracy. In the latter, 
partial legitimacy exists with national reconciliation. Some changes touch the 
industrial and organizational sector. Partial inclusion of Islamists and secularists 
takes place in absolute liberalized autocracies such as Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco. 
In the future, those liberalized autocracies will give birth to a fragmented civil 
society, a trap in economic and political reform, an enforcement of the Islamist 
power, and a weak legitimacy. All of that explains the impossibility of democratic 
change according to Brumberg (2003).  
2.2.4- Social Perspective  	  
Vickie Langohr (2004) also stresses the role of civil society in the public 
sphere. She studies the advocacy of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at a 
time when the political opposition was too weak. However, their actions failed to 
lead democratization simply because of their incapability of sustaining successful 
campaigns against determined authoritarian regimes. Langohr examines the 
conditions that promote the expressions of the opposition through nongovernmental 
organizations rather than opposition parties. 
Fawaz Traboulsi studies the importance of the public sphere as a factor in the 
transition to democracy, especially in countries with authoritarian rule. Using 
Turgeon Habermas’ notion of the public sphere , Traboulsi points out the importance 
of popular action in the democratization process. After studying the case of Iraq, he 
highlights the need to use violence to achieve authoritarian regime breakdown.  
Rabab El Mahdi (2009) argues that increased political opportunities, 
successful cultural framing and mobilization structures were tools enabling the 2004-
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2005 prodemocracy movement in Egypt to achieve some success. She studies the 
importance of social movement theory. Nevertheless, she argues that the Egyptian 
experience was limited by the ‘clientalist’ system, the spirit of high dependency on 
the regime for jobs, and fragmented opposition.   
2.2.5- International Perspective  	  
Robert Blecher (2003), Michele Dunne (2009), and Steven Heydemann 
(2010) stressed the importance of external actors and trans-regional actors to explain 
the robustness of authoritarianism. Blecher (2003) examined US role in promoting 
democracy in the Arab region, suggesting that democracy promotion in this region is 
a very long and difficult process. Michele Dunne (2009) studied the Obama freedom 
agenda in the Middle East with the current challenges especially in Palestine and 
Iraq. She suggests that democracy appears to hurt US strategic interests and will 
result in Islamist groups rising to power. 
 Heydemann (2010) was also critical of promoting democracy in the Middle 
East. Democracy promotion did not cause any significant change in this region 
especially regarding political power distribution. Heydemann (2010) acknowledges 
the failure of democracy promotion when examining the ranking and the indices in 
terms of freedom and corruption of the MENA region . The figure below portrays the 
level of political rights and civil liberties from 2000 to 2009. We notice in year 2009 
an increasing trend regarding civil liberties and a decreasing trend concerning 
political rights.  
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Figure 2.1 Freedom House : Middle East Ratings (Heydemann, 2010: 3) 
 
Graham Fuller and Timo Behr discuss the minimum amount of democratic 
change that can occur. They argue that Arabs can improve their regime while 
preserving their authoritarian rule (Fuller, 2004). But this new style of 
authoritarianism is expected to be the reason for the regime’s collapse in Tunis and 
Egypt, because a dictator cannot rule with democratic changes and tools being 
implemented. Graham Fuller discusses the compatibility of Islam and Democracy. 
The author explores oil production, income levels, the nature of Arab states, Arab 
Israeli tensions, geography, longtime western support for friendly tyrants in the 
Middle East, and Islamism. Fuller (2004) discusses how each factor alone is 
compatible with democratic hopes.  
Section two in this chapter clearly states that no author has expected regime 
breakdown. They explained the robustness of authoritarianism using different 
approaches and perspectives. However, Section three will introduce and describe the 
authoritarian breakdown phenomenon.  
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2.3 - Authoritarian Regime Breakdown  	  
 After reviewing different views explaining the robustness of authoritarian 
regimes in the Middle East, one must define what constitutes an authoritarian regime 
breakdown. The breakdown phase is important because it illustrates the possible path 
of democratization. The concept of democratization is assumed similar in all 
nondemocratic countries. But recent studies have shown that no such continuity 
exists. Democratic transitions vary from one autocracy to another. Various 
institutional attributes have been added to the democracy preconditions’ lists of 
different countries.  
2.3.1- Types of Authoritarian Regimes 	   “Getting to democracy is easier from a regime in which competition is encouraged 
and the main challenge is to broaden participation; getting to democracy is much 
more difficult from a regime that has no tradition of political competition, however 
inclusive and participatory it might be” (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997 , p.273) 
 
 Classical theories used to distinguish between totalitarianism and 
authoritarianism. “Totalitarianism” was ultimately omitted from discussion since 
scarcely any regime fits this description (Brooker, 2000). In 1996, Linz and Stephan 
worked on adding “post-totalitarianism” and “sultanism” to the old typology. In 
2002, Larry Diamond explored the field of  “hybrid” regimes. According to his 
study, regimes are situated between “democracy and politically closed 
authoritarianism” (Diamond, 2002, 25-31). The latter include competitive 
authoritarianism, hegemonic electoral authoritarianism, and ambiguous regimes in 
1999 and 2003 (Diamond, 2002,p. 25-31).  
 However, Barbara Geddes used more qualitative distinctions to explain her 
typology. Based on Huntington’s study, Barbara Geddes classifies authoritarian 
regimes according to three categories: military, personalist and single party regimes.  
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Some regime types face harder conditions for change than others. Every type of a 
regime carries with it “the seeds of their own disintegration” (Huntington, 1991, 
p.110-113). The most fragile are military regimes. Personalistic ones last longer but 
not as long as one-party states.  
Military regime breakdown starts with a clear division within the military’s 
rule. Geddes tackles the issue of military regime by focusing on the interests of 
military officers. There is a corporate interest that relies on maintaining order, 
discipline, strong military cohesion, and territorial integrity. Officers care as much 
about military unity as they do of control of the government itself and care about 
safeguarding their resources and independence (Geddes, 1999). That tends to 
threaten the regime especially when faced with external pressure. This type of 
regime does not have strong roots in society, which also makes it harder to control. 
(Hadenius & Teorell , 2006) 
Single-party regimes often collapse after exogenous shocks. However, party 
cadres have simpler preferences than military officers. They simply want to stay in 
office, control government policy, and maintain ultimate power. Geddes (1999) 
discusses the effects of rivalries and competition in single-party regimes. After 
studying succession crises and internal struggles, Geddes concludes that a power 
struggle within single-party regime is not enough for a democratic transition. 
Observers and analysts suggest the importance of other factors to activate the 
transition process. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) focus on the issue of economic 
crisis. Huntington (1991) explains the necessity of external pressure, while Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1992) look for the need of popular protest in order to bring down 
“long-standing dictatorships”.  
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Additionally, Geddes recognizes other endogenous causes of instability. 
Single-party regimes usually control the allocation of jobs, education, opportunities, 
and positions in government institutions. This type of regime survives transitions 
because it works through institutional structures. They legalize opposition and hold 
free and fair elections. Because of the latter, external shocks are deemed necessary to 
destabilize the regime.  
As for personalist regimes, they can be vulnerable to breakdown as a result of 
a leader’s death or a coercive coup.  They attract the loyalty of their citizens by 
providing material rewards. They are rooted in the society through developed 
networks, which work on a clientelistic basis (Hadenius & Teorell, 2006). Therefore 
the sense of loyalty grows and people tend to feel dependent on the position of the 
ruling leader. Thus, this type of regime is weakest when facing an economic crisis. In 
addition, violent overthrows, coups, assassinations, other unexpected uprising and 
sometimes invasion can lead to the breakdown of personalist regimes.  
Basing their research on Barbara Geddes’ study, Alex Hadenius and Jan 
Teorell (2006) explore authoritarian regime types. They start their analysis by 
distinguishing three types of “political power maintenance”: hereditary succession, 
use of military force, and popular election.  To add, they classify authoritarian 
regimes as: monarchy, such as the regime in Saudi Arabia, military regime, such as 
in Chile and electoral regimes.  The latter are divided into three types. The first is 
called the “no-party regime”, where elections take place but no political party is 
allowed. The second, the “one party regimes”, forbids one and allow all or vice 
versa.  And the third is “the limited multiparty regime. Here, a very limited degree of 
competition is allowed. (Hadenius & Teorell, 2006) 
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2.3.2- Distribution of Authoritarian Regimes and the Breakdown 
 Figure 2 below shows the regime types from 1972 till 2003. The graph shows 
the change and the path of every regime type. The only kind of government that did 
not vary much is the governing monarchy, which prevails primarily in the Arab 
World. In fact, according to Hadenius and Teorell , military dictatorships do not last 
as long as one-party regime. Monarchies, however, not only last longer, around 25  
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than other regime types (Hadenius and Teorell, 2006 p.17).  
 Benjamin Smith (2005) also studied authoritarian breakdown basing his 
approach on the one used by Geddes. He focuses on single party rule regimes, and on 
their long-term durability.  He unpacks the antecedent conditions that allow for an 
uprising that can topple a regime.  In the figure below, he lists all authoritarian 
regimes that are still in power.  
Figure 2.2 Regime type frequencies by year  (Hadenius and Teorell, 2006:10) 
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Figure 2.3 Regimes still in power as of 2000 (Smith, 2005: 423) 
  
Figure three is important for the triple threat. A triple threat is a regime that 
combines single party, military and personalist characteristics. The triple threat 
regime such as Egypt and Syria has enough power to survive and escape breakdown. 
Smith argues that the conditions that topple this kind of regime should be exceptional 
(Smith, 2005). Moreover, when an authoritarian breakdown does occur, democracy 
is not always the end result.  Recent examples, especially after WWII, have shown 
that authoritarian regimes are often replaced by other authoritarian regimes. A study 
made by Hadenius and Teorell (2006) has shown that only 23 percent of 
authoritarian regime breakdowns have resulted in a move towards a democratic path. 
 Transitions among monarchies are very difficult since they are so resistant to 
change. Traditionally, a one-party state’s transition is complex. When the breakdown 
happens, authoritarian rule takes two forms. One form is a “leading multiparty 
system. The other is a change to a traditional military regime” (Hadenius & Teorell, 
2006, p.18) When military regimes change, they usually end up shifting to a limited 
multiparty system. Democratic transition is more likely to occur under 
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military/multiparty systems (Hadenius & Teorell, 2006). The figure below illustrates 
the most prevalent routes toward democracy. Each line shows the likelihood of 
regime change. The main path is the one that involves limited multiparty system. The 
latter is the most likely to be transformed into a democracy.  
 
Figure 2.4: Democratic Pathway (Hadenius and Teorell, 2006:20) 
 
 
 	  	  
	  
 
 22	  
 
2.4 – Explaining Authoritarian regime breakdown  
 
Barbara Geddes and Valerie Bunce explored the independent variables 
explaining authoritarian regime transitions to democracy. They list a number of 
variables that explain the process of democratic transition. These variables will be 
compared to the breakdown of authoritarianism in Egypt. 
Barbara Geddes’ study (1999) was chosen because it synthesizes the results 
of many comparative studies undertaken in the last 20 years. It is a theoretical 
analysis used to explain democratization experience of authoritarian regimes. In her 
approach, she surveys all previous studies and identifies all former arguments about 
democratization.  Her data includes 163 authoritarian regimes in 94 countries.  
Although differences in breakdown patterns exist, Geddes (1999) lists the 
general causes of regime breakdown taken from different studies. These are: poverty, 
poor country economic performance, splits within military government, popular 
protest, pacts between elites, and exogenous shocks.  
Most importantly, Geddes offers a theoretical model in which she displays 
the six variables for transition from authoritarian regimes towards democracy. 
 First, poverty is the most important predictor for transitions. But in order for 
democracy to survive, a certain level of economic development is required. Based on 
an analysis made by Przeworski and Limongi in 1997, Geddes points out the 
likelihood of a relapse to an authoritarian regime when the level of economic 
development falls below international standard (Geddes, 1999). Thus, a positive 
relationship between democracy and economic development is observed. According 
to Londregan and Poole’s statistical studies, poverty has been seen as a “stronger 
predictor of transitions to authoritarianism” (Geddes, 2004, 3).  
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Poor economic performance is another stimulator of authoritarian breakdown. 
Another positive relationship exists between low economic growth and transitions. 
Additionally, economic crises have an impact on regime changes, which was 
observed, especially in the third wave of democratization (Geddes, 1999).  
Barbara Geddes introduces a third variable to her theory: splits within the 
system. As O’Donnel and Schmitter (1986) observed, “There is no transition whose 
beginning is not the consequence- direct or indirect- of important divisions within the 
authoritarian regime itself”(p.16). 
Given that the process of democratization varies from one region to another, 
the nature of these splits is also different. Splits within military occurred in Greece 
and in Latin America. In Spain and Portugal, splits occurred within the old regimes. 
In Africa and the Soviet Union, splits happened throughout society. In these latter 
cases, transition rose from below, as the opposition grew stronger (Geddes, 1999)  
Popular protests and mobilization, Geddes’s fourth variable, takes place in 
the democratization process, but usually happen late in the process. This variable can 
sometimes push the transition faster but cannot be the main cause behind 
liberalization and the implementation of democratic principles. In Europe and in 
Africa, popular mobilizations allowed for negotiations between opposing parties 
(Geddes, 1999) 
Pacts between elites are considered to be the fifth variable. Agreements 
among opposing elites have proven to be very useful in democratic transition. They 
are necessary to establish formulas for power sharing and policy choice. Geddes 
noted that sometimes this variable maybe absent as was in the case in some African 
countries (Geddes, 1999). 
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Lastly, Geddes studied the effects of exogenous shocks capable of 
undermining authoritarian regimes. These shocks can hinder economic performance 
and the equal distribution of benefits. Geddes highlights the existence of two types of 
shocks; geopolitical and economic. The second oil crisis in the late 1970s was one of 
the most important causes for the breakdown of 14 military regimes. Geddes 
suggests that crises are not the direct cause of authoritarian breakdown, but can 
exacerbate the situation. In this case, the authoritarian regime struggles aggressively 
to stay in power. When it feels so close to the end, the regime usually starts 
distributing benefits, talks about reforms, and establishes a coalition. Exogenous 
shocks surprise the leader and increase the possibility of authoritarian breakdown. 
Personalist regimes tend to be the most affected by these crises (Geddes, 1999). As 
Bratton and Von de Walle (1997) conclude, “The economic crisis undercut the 
material foundations of patrimonial rule: With ever fewer resources to distribute, 
political elites faced a growing problem of how to maintain control of clientelist 
networks”.  
Geddes revisited these themes again in another study in 2004. Her study tests 
theoretical implications that were concluded after World War II concerning regime 
breakdown.  Focusing on the Middle East, Geddes made a surprising conclusion at 
that time. Although many arguments propose similarities between Islam and 
authoritarianism, she suggests that the Middle East’s dictatorships are not durable. 
This lack of durability does not directly indicate a near occurrence of 
democratization but once democratization occurs, the dictatorships will follow one 
after another (Geddes, 2004). Geddes argued that authoritarianism tends to be 
present in Islamic countries as seen in the Middle East. But unexpectedly, Geddes’s 
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study suggests that countries with large Islamic populations are more prone to 
authoritarian regime breakdown (Geddes, 2004).  
In contrast, Valerie Bunce bases her study on examples from the post-
communist experience. She uses a comparative approach in producing her 
generalizations. Her study involves recent debates in the democratization field. 
Bunce tries to balance comparative theory and real knowledge. Moreover, her study 
involves the whole process of democratization. She focuses on relationships between 
transition and regime path, and between consolidation and sustainability. Bunce 
complements Geddes’s work by focusing on other variables and by providing a 
whole package for the democratization process.  
As mentioned above, Bunce (2003) analyses the whole democratization 
phenomenon: regime breakdown, transition phase, democratization, and the 
consolidation of democracy. Each particular phase has its set of variables. This 
chapter focuses on the topic of regime breakdown. After studying different scenarios 
in Latin America and Eastern Europe, Bunce identifies five variables involved in the 
process of authoritarian regime breakdown; economic development, elites, 
immediate influences, mass mobilization and nationalism.  
To start, Bunce stresses the importance of the relationship between economic 
development and democracy. A correlation exists between income per capita and 
democratization. Thus, to predict a regime breakdown, one should study the level of 
economic development and reform. Bunce (2003) bases her argument on the 
Freedom House report that underscores the relationship between economic 
development, political liberties and civil rights.  In general, sustained growth 
weakens the power of the authoritarian regime since it helps the expansion of civil 
society, which is capable of checking the ‘monopolistic government’. It has also the 
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power to delay its fall taking the examples of Singapore, and Malaysia.  
Additionally, economic development is necessary to expand the educational force. 
The latter will help create a mature capitalist economy and will start demanding 
inclusion, accountability and a balance of power. 
Bunce then identifies the second relationship between the elites and the 
transition to democracy. Political elites play an important role in the process of 
regime breakdown and democratization. This relationship was seen in the last three 
waves of democratization. Moreover, elites in power and in opposition are highly 
influenced by mass mobilization. Elites tend to be the best catalyst in long-term 
developments because they are pointed as the good members of the society. In 
addition, they manage through their actions to be the founders of democracy by 
design political institutions. The quality and sustainability of the new democracy will 
be defined once the elites decide whether to be more or less constrained by the 
democratic game. Bunce notes the difficult phase of transition when elites will try to 
gradually destroy the institutional and cultural legacies of authoritarianism. Elites 
can help in starting the transition, but will have a difficult time consolidating 
democracy. (Bunce, 2000) 
Third, the important variable is the immediate influence of the regime. This 
variable has shaped the fate of many countries. It acts as a stimulus for the entire 
country. Immediate influence of a regime is considered much more significant than 
historical context in the regime breakdown scenario. According to Bunce, those 
influences make the transition more uncertain. In order to reduce uncertainty, Bunce 
refers to Dankwart Rustow who emphasized the need to prior resolve all national and 
state dilemmas (Bunce, 2003).  
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Mass protests and the role of civil society is the fourth dynamic in the process 
of regime breakdown. After analyzing successful transitions, Bunce notes that 
transitions always begin with mass protests, with the exception of Hungary. Mass 
mobilization by itself facilitates the transition towards democracy. Protests signal 
authoritarian regime breakdown. Leaders are forced to join the bargaining table and 
different factions of the opposition unite in order to reject the old regime. Bunce 
describes mass mobilization as “a mandate for radical change” (Bunce, 2003, p.172). 
 
The fifth variable is nationalism, which plays an important role in the regime 
breakdown process. In Bunce’s analysis, national homogeneity is a necessary 
condition for a successful transition. Heterogeneity can induce, change or affect 
certain aspects but undermines the democratization process. Once established, new 
democracies are prone to breakdown if they exhibit a large degree of heterogeneity. 
Thus Bunce identifies two conditions required for the process of democratization. 
The first condition is prior statehood. The second condition is public success in 
creating strong agreement on the new structure of the nation, the boundaries and the 
balance of power. Although many have argued that “nationalism is an undemocratic 
project”, Bunce argues that a sense of nationalism is required for successful 
democratic transitions. Nationalism is a tool for challenging authoritarian rule, 
constructing social responsibility, and making the government responsive and 
accountable to its community (Bunce, 2003, p.176).  
 
 
Bunce also argues that two relationships are very important. Democratization 
occurs through a series of waves. One relationship is between transitional politics 
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and subsequent regime trajectories. The other relationship exists between the 
consolidation and the sustainability of democracy. She argues that the degree of 
uncertainty varies according to each situation and that mass mobilization is important 
for democratic consolidation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 Barbara Geddes and Valerie Bunce’s Variables 
 	  
 
 
 
 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Barbara Geddes 1. Poverty 
2. Poor economic performance (low 
economic growth) 
3. Splits in the system (within Military 
Government)   
4. Popular protest  
5. Pacts between Elites (power sharing) 
6. Exogenous shocks (geopolitical and 
economical) 
Valerie Bunce 1. Economic development  
2. Elites 
3. Immediate influences  
4. Mass Mobilization  
5. Nationalism  
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2.5- Conclusion 	  
 This chapter examined authoritarian breakdown in comparative perspective. 
It specifically studied two authors, Barbara Geddes and Valerie Bunce, who analyzed 
regime breakdown. The figure 2.1 above summarizes the variables, whether common 
or different, used by those two authors. The next chapter will treat Egypt in particular 
and will analyze the events on the eve of the uprising. 	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CHAPTER THREE 	  
EGYPT ON THE DAWN OF THE UPRISING 	  	  
3.1- Introduction 	  
This chapter examines the Egyptian state on the eve of regime change. It first 
defines Egypt’s authoritarian system then describes Egypt under Nasser and Sadat. 
The chapter then considers Sadat’s different approach, with particular reference to 
the consequences of his Infitah policies. It closes exploring Egypt under Hosni 
Mubarak’s rule, highlighting the phases of liberalization then de-liberalization.  
3.2- Defining Egypt and its Authoritarian Regime 	  
Egypt has a mixed legal system. It combines English common law, Islamic 
rule and Napoleonic policies (Platan & Teal, 2001).  Islam is the official religion 
since article 2 of the constitution decrees that Islamic law, or the Sharia, is the 
official and main source of legislation (Stacher, 2011). The country is divided into 26 
administrative regions. The government controlled all power and interfered heavily 
in the economic frame, political parties, opposition, elections, and judiciary, but most 
importantly, in military issues. The Sadat constitution of 1971 gives the president 
control and power to establish patron-client relationships and choose who should be 
in power. The People’s Assembly1 nominates the president to a period of six years. 
This nomination is later on endorsed in a popular referendum.  
The system and the political opposition show that Egypt is an authoritarian 
state (Stacher, 2004).  By definition, authoritarianism is defined as “a situation where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The People’s Assembly is the elected lower house. In theory, this house can check the president’s 
power. Actually, today this house has no role at all since it is forbidden to interfere in the foreign and 
defense affairs. (Platan, Teal, 2001: 4) 
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(a) freedom is restricted in favor of obedience to authority and (b) this authority is 
itself exercised with restrictions” (Brooker, 2000, p.22).  
Authoritarian regimes are divided between total and partial autocracies.  
Total autocracies such as Saudi Arabia and Syria have full control over everything. 
Partial autocracies, such as Algeria, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar and most 
importantly Egypt, have a certain degree of openness although the latter is still under 
the direct control of the regime. A small division between the state and society exists, 
with a special attention given to religious institutions. Moreover, in partial 
autocracies, the state focuses on economic development and growth.  
3.2- Republican Egypt under Nasser and Sadat 	  
Egypt’s authoritarian regime may be traced to the coup against the monarchy. 
In July 1952, the Free Officers’ Movement, under the command of Colonel Jamal 
Abdel Nasser, overthrew King Farouq. They succeed in abolishing the monarchy and 
declaring a new independent republic (Marsot, 1985). Under Nasser, Egypt rose in 
power and influence within the Arab world. Armed with the ideology of pan-
Arabism2, he elevated Egypt to the position of leadership in the Arab Middle East.  
3.2.1- Nasser’s Egypt 	  
Nasser established an authoritarian state. He united the country under his 
leadership and exploited Egypt’s resources to “mobilize the potential power of the 
country” (Kerr, 1961, p. 18-22). In the 1960s, Nasser created the Arab Socialist 
Union (ASU). The latter was the only ruling party representing the regime in power. 
The ASU later became the National Democratic Party or NDP, which was the 
governing party under Sadat and Mubarak. Nasser outlawed all political parties and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Pan Arabism: Arab Nationalism and Arabism (Dawisha, 2003; 4) 
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radical social groups, but especially the Muslim Brotherhood, thus uniting the 
domestic society (Sharp, 2007). 
Nasser also succeeded in consolidating the authority of the state, especially 
over the political and economic domains. He introduced a number of economic 
reforms. First, in order to reduce and later abolish all British and French influence 
within the country, he nationalized Egypt’s privately owned banks, commercial 
businesses, insurance and industrial companies. Later, he implemented the Agrarian 
Reform Law of 1952. The latter limited the amount of lands any individual can hold 
and enabled everyone to own land. By this strategy, Nasser allowed the state to 
collect more tax revenue and allowed the population to increase its income (Kerr, 
2007). Additionally, Nasser built the Aswan High Dam and nationalized the Suez 
Canal. He also implemented the Five-Year Development Plan that resulted in the 
expansion of the industrial sector. Between 1952 and 1959, the amount of industrial 
production rose by 47 percent (Kerr, 2007). 
During Nasser’s time, Egypt received financial assistance from the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The regime benefited from government revenues and 
aids to increase military spending and to make arms deals that gave Egypt an entrée 
to new military technology that other neighboring countries did not have. With all 
the above, Egypt’s military system became the most advanced and powerful in the 
Arab Middle East and thus allowing Egypt to emerge as regional power.  
Nasser was responsible for redirecting Egypt towards socialism. He was also 
aware that foreign policy was important. He became the hero of Arab nationalism 
after defeating the Tripartite Aggression in 1956. However, the loss of the 1967 war 
ended his domestic and regional leadership. Nasser died in 1970 but managed 
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through his rule to establish an authoritarian regime that lasted for many years to 
come (Marsot, 1985). 
 
3.2.2- Sadat’s Egypt  	  
Vice President Anwar Al Sadat assumed power after Nasser’s death. At the 
time, the internal situation was in shambles with a collapsed economy after the war, 
massive public disorder and a demoralized divided country. He swiftly distanced 
himself from Nasser policies. People loyal to Nasser opposed him. They believed in 
heavy industrialization, state socialism and government control over society 
(Hinnebush, 1985). Thus, Sadat went through a “Corrective Revolution” that revised 
Nasser’s failed policies and freed the government from the old ideology (Lippman, 
1989). This revolution consolidated Sadat’s position. He reorganized the ASU, called 
for new parliamentary elections, and started implementing domestic changes.  
Sadat created a new constitution. The latter mainly focused on consolidating 
power in the hands of the president and on weakening all aspects of democratic 
power. Sadat endorsed a certain degree of domestic political expression.  Since 1975, 
new political groups3 that voiced the opinions of the left, right and center were 
formed (Federal Research Division, 2007). Moreover, he started tolerating the 
Muslim Brotherhood by allowing the organization to freely operate in the country. 
Although not legally recognized, the Muslim Brotherhood was grateful to Sadat.  
Sadat’s main policy change focused on the Egyptian economy. He inherited a 
heavy debt due to the 1967 war and a high number of unemployed but educated 
people (Vatikiotis, 1985). As a result, he decided to base Egypt’s economy on a free 
market model (Ates, 2005).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The National Progressive Unionist Organization, the Socialist Liberal Organization, the Egyptian 
Arab Socialist Organization, the National Democratic Party and Socialist Labor Party.  
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In 1974, Sadat issued the “October Working Paper” that allowed the 
acceptance of unconditional foreign aids and loans to boost the development. Most 
importantly, that paper introduced an innovative economic policy, referred to as the 
Infitah, or “Open Door Policy”. The latter liberated Egypt’s economy and reversed 
Nasser’s socialist policies.  The government was forced to accept tax breaks, tariff 
incentives and less control and restrictions over the industrial sector. Hinnebush, 
(1985) Infitah enacted Law 43 of 1974, which accepted the creation of private 
companies. It encouraged foreign investment and eliminated all kinds of government 
monopoly over financial institutions. It also encouraged joint ventures between the 
private and the public sectors (Lippman, 1989) 
The “Open Door Policy” succeeded in putting the Egyptian economy on 
track, increasing the GDP and boosting foreign investment. However, it created some 
problems. Egypt went further in debt and the United States was encouraged to send 
more aid in the form of loans to stabilize the economy. Sadat also resorted to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Nevertheless, the loans and 
aid forced Sadat to reduce the funding of public education and health care services 
and to remove subsidies. This resulted in deep social discontent (Hinnebusch, 1985). 
The population moved away from Sadat and turned to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
especially that the latter started providing services not provided by the state. They 
created a parallel economy offering health care, education and charities (Ates, 2005). 
Egyptians saw Islam as an alternative to pan- Arabism.  
Infitah also made Sadat change some foreign policies that shook Egypt’s role 
as a regional leader. After initiating a war against Israel in October 1973, the United 
States worked tirelessly to engage the two countries in diplomatic negotiations. And 
unlike Nasser, Sadat was not concerned with regional leadership, but rather with 
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achieving peace with its neighbors and moving Egypt to the US orbit. After Sadat’s 
visit to Jerusalem in 1977, and the Camp David accords in 1978, a peace agreement 
between Israel and Egypt was signed in 1979. Sadat’s signature on the accord made 
Egypt the exception in the Arab world and led to its expulsion from the Arab League. 
Radical Islamists later assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981, and his Vice President 
Mohammad Hosni Mubarak took power (Marsot, 1985). 
3.3- Mubarak’s Egypt  	  
Under Nasser and Sadat’s rule, the great majority of Egyptians were still 
“contained” witnesses to the dramatic “political and economic overhauls of their 
society” (Ryan, 2001, p.6). Hosni Mubarak established his legitimacy and ensured 
his power survival by first shifting from political containment to liberalization.  He 
successfully used the authoritarian state structure to exercise his unchallenged power. 
He excelled in building a coercive state with a legal basis to suppress the opposition 
and engineered a democratic facade to cover his monopoly over power.  
Other than being a partial autocracy, Egypt under Mubarak was also a model 
of “electoral authoritarianism” (Tlemcani, 2007, p.7). This regime is characterized by 
a passive participatory nature. This is because Egyptian participated in rigged and 
fake elections. The government working on controlling all governmental power lost 
its credibility towards its citizens (Tlemcani, 2007).  In this system, the president 
limited the ability of the elected officials to truly represent their population while 
ensuring their faithfulness towards the regime. The latter accepted some political 
movements under a fake allowance of pluralism. The judiciary was partially 
independent but suffers from presidential political pressures. The media was 
surrounded by boundaries.  Opposition in Egypt can obtain a limited number of seats 
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in the parliament but the majority always sides in favor of the president (Elagati, 
2011). 
3.3.1- The Authoritarian Structure  
The Egyptian system, like other Arab ones, was created in order to maintain 
regime stability when facing severe legitimacy problems. James Quinlivan (1999, p. 
3) argues that these regimes strengthen regime stability as they become “coup-
proof”. He claims that: 
“The essential systems necessary for coup-proofing are: (1) The exploitation 
of family, ethnic, and religious loyalties; (2) the creation of parallel militaries 
that counterbalance the regular military forces; (3) the establishment of 
security agencies that watch everyone, including other security agencies; (4) 
the encouragement of expertness in the regular military; and (5) funding.” 
 
Since 1952, the Egyptian regime has built a system geared towards regime survival. 
Kassem (2004) also studied Egypt ‘s political system and found out that four main 
aspects characterize it system: exclusionary laws, patronage, cooptation and a 
coercive apparatus (Kassem, 2004).  
 First of all, the constitution was designed with an unequal balance of power. 
It created an exclusionary system since the executive branch holds remarkable 
powers compared to the judicial and legislative ones. Sadat’s 1971 constitution 
granted the president immense powers making the latter capable of bypassing 
parliament’s complaints, calling a referendum and dissolving the People’s Assembly 
(Kassem, 2004). Moreover, the president had the power to oversee and manage 
judiciary affairs. He was the one who can launch state security courts, appoint and 
dismiss the cabinet and choose judges. The Egyptian president also had the ultimate 
power to cancel laws, rule by decree and announce “a state of emergency”.  
 In 1981, Mohammad Hosni Mubarak declared a state of emergency after 
Sadat was assassinated. In general, a state of emergency is usually declared in order 
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to preserve and safeguard political control. However, in the Egyptian case, the state 
of emergency lasted throughout Mubarak’s reign. The constitutional framework gave 
Mubarak the privilege to preserve a desired status quo.  This state helped the 
president uphold more power for political control (Kassem, 2004). Since political 
activity could be censored, people could be easily charged of crimes, directly 
arrested and sometimes taken to military courts. Opposition and other political 
parties were bound by restrictions and were not able to meet and function due to the 
difficulties they faced. Patronage was another tool used for regime survival as 
Kassem suggests:  
“In the absence of democratic institutions, accountable representation and a 
compelling and mobilizing ideology, authoritarian regimes depend on the 
distribution of patronage to establish a clientelistic system that secures some 
form of stability” (2004, p. 4) 
 
 After gaining full independence from the British, the presidents created a 
system of patronage. Resources were distributed to these supporting the regime as 
well as to members of the governing party. Egyptians became completely co-opted 
into the system and started supporting the status quo in order to preserve their 
interests. A patron-client relationship was consequently created. The president 
provides services when the citizen supports him. Mubarak reinforced this concept 
and became the ultimate patron in the Egyptian society. He created a patron-client 
hierarchy (Henrisken, 2009).  
 The coercive system is based on the military and the internal security. 
Usually, in democratic countries, this apparatus works for the protection and for the 
defense of the government. Nevertheless, authoritarianism demands much more than 
that. These institutions are deeply extended into the political system. In this case, the 
military and the police work and aggressively intervene to support the regime 
(Kassem, 2004). 
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 In Egypt, like other authoritarian systems, the president acts as the supreme 
commander of the armed forces and the police. As noted before, the president is 
capable of nominating the leaders of these institutions and establishing clear and 
close ties with these forces. President Mubarak used these institutions on a regular 
basis to control the political activists, the opposition and ‘chaos’. Moreover, as seen 
in most Egyptian elections, the police has the ultimate right to supervise the 
elections, control the actual voting and count the ballots (Kassem, 2004, p.7).  
 
3.3.2- Liberalization then De-Liberalization 	  
Once in power, Hosni Mubarak pursued political liberalization during the 
parliamentary elections of 1984 ad 1987. When, in 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood 
emerged as the largest opposition bloc, Mubarak reversed political liberalization and 
reverted to a pure authoritarian structure. Although the 1990s witnessed some shy 
gestures of political liberalization, Mubarak never discarded the use of coercive 
measures.  
Sadat and Mubarak are similar in this respect. They both reversed their 
political liberalization policies when they are challenged by opposition powers. 
Mubarak introduced de-liberalization policies. Some of the indicators were 
emergency law, antiterrorist law, legislation governing professional syndicates and 
trade unions, Journalist Syndicate Law, and Press Law (Aknur, 2007). Emergency 
law, forced in 1981, was extended for many years. That law was the cause of many 
huge human right violations (Cassandra, 1995). Mubarak also introduced the 
“antiterrorist law”, amended in 1992. This policy was harsh and involved any action 
“disrupting public order, harming individuals, damaging the environment and 
financial assets, and obstructing the application of law” (Kienle, 1998, p. 222). 
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Moreover, in 1993, Mubarak ratified the “Law to Guarantee Democracy within the 
Professional Syndicates.” This latter law required a minimum voter turnout and if 
that was not met, the results would be voided and judges appointed by the regime 
would supervise syndicates. That law gave Mubarak more power to overturn 
elections (Cassandra, 1995). Furthermore, in 1995, a “Press Law” was imposed on 
publication crimes. The crimes are defined as “printing of misleading information”, 
“false rumors”, and “defamations” (Kienle, 1998,p.223).  
Political liberalization started in the 1970s and lasted until the 1990s when 
the regime reversed course. The political liberalization strategy fluctuated between 
political opening and some severe setbacks. According to Noah Feldman (2003), the 
rise of political Islam accelerated the de-liberalization process in Egypt. Civil 
society, controlled by the state, did not play an important role in that strategy. 
However, when Islamists interfered, the government automatically introduced de-
liberalization policies, which challenged the notion of a blocked transition to 
democracy.  
Political liberalization was intertwined with economic reforms introduced 
during Sadat’s era. Mubarak took power after Sadat, assuring his country that he 
would resist any domestic or foreign investments, which would hinder Egypt’s 
productive capacity (Weinbaum, 1996). When in power, the economy was rusting. 
Abnormal external debt had reached $ 21 billion. Egyptians suffered high inflation, 
foreign exchange shortage, balance of payment problems and decline of oil prices 
and workers’ remittances (Baynard, 1995). At first, and in order to stabilize the 
situation, Hosni Mubarak continued with Sadat’s policy in the path of economic 
liberalization. Thus, in accordance to the Infitah policies, Mubarak expanded the 
process of political liberalization by extending civil liberties and implementing a 
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series of economic reforms.  He also maintained negotiations with the IMF, the 
World Bank and the Paris Club to attract foreign assistance (Momani, 2003). In 
1991, tight fiscal and monetary measures were introduced with the agreement of the 
IMF. Liberalization of prices and of foreign trade pushed the economy forward. In 
addition to that, and in order to consolidate the economy in the longer run, reforms 
took place in the public sector followed by the privatization of a huge number of 
companies.  
3.4 - Mubarak’s Egypt on the Eve of the Uprising 	  
 Mubarak ruled as a king in Egypt. Since 1981, his reelection was virtually 
guaranteed and he was ‘circuitously’ named president for life. Mubarak and the 
National Democratic Party, succeed in dominating and controlling Egypt’s 
government, economy, military and civil society for many years. 
 
 3.4.1 -The Government 	  
 Starting in 1981, Mubarak undertook a process of political liberalization. He 
started by releasing political prisoners, calling for national reconciliation and greater 
freedoms. Mubarak succeeded in winning the Egyptians’ trust and goodwill. 
However, the parliamentary elections of 1984 revealed the real Mubarak (Hilal, 
1986). He mobilized the country’s bureaucracy so that his ruling party, the National 
Democratic Party, would win.  The NDP won 87 % of the parliamentary seats 
(Hassan, 2010). 
In 1987, another parliamentary election took place. For many scholars, this 
period witnessed a vital step towards liberalization, especially since the ruling party 
received only 77.78 % of the parliamentary seats. The Muslim Brotherhood was 
regarded as the opposition. Nonetheless, the opposition was complaining about the 
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unfairness of the election law. The elections were again rigged and government 
pressures were immense. Mubarak responded to the opposition’s complaints by 
dissolving the People’s Assembly and calling for new elections in 1990 (Abdel 
Majid & Mossad, 1992). Assuring more control over the government, Mubarak 
started by tightening his control over citizens and by limiting their involvement in 
the political life. Another election took place in year 2000. That election took place 
under full judicial supervision especially since the previous elections were called 
unlawful. But as usual Mubarak’s ruling party won 87.8 % (Hassan, 2010). Finally, 
the 2005 elections, the NDP won again but did not obtain the same share of seats. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, for the first time, won 88 seats (Al Shobky, 2005).  
Throughout his long tenure, Mubarak painted the Egyptian system with 
corruption. Although Egypt is a part of the UN Convention against corruption, the 
latter became an essential part of the state system. Officials and politicians were 
involved in this corrupt system.  It enabled social groups to exercise their power over 
state institutions. Corruption was stretched to the parties, syndicates, NGOs and 
others (Amin, 2009). The bad economic conditions and the lack of respect to laws 
nurtured the corruption concept. Nevertheless, corruption benefited the elites, state 
officials and the wealthy Egyptians. They were able to make fortunes in a very short 
period of time leaving the poor Egyptians behind.  
 Corruption widened the economic and social gap, and destroyed the notion 
of legitimacy and respect to the regime in power (Hassan, 2010). In 2009, the Ahram 
Center for Political and Strategic Studies4 conducted a survey about the 
consequences of regular corruption. Egyptians identified corruption as the cause of 
high commodity prices and low wages (Ahram Center, 2009).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A government think-tank 
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In its final years, Mubarak’s regime violated repeatedly the Egyptians’ civil 
and political rights. Torture and random imprisonments were widely used by the 
regime. The latter controlled the freedom of assembly and association (Stacher, 
2011). More obstacles were introduced to the legitimate right of a voter and of a 
candidate to participate freely in elections. Moreover, media laws were introduced to 
weaken the opposition. The opposition’s demands were not even considered. The 
judiciary was also subject to Mubarak’s intimidation.   
The government did not respect religious diversity and exercised 
discrimination against different sects.  In particular, discrimination against the Copts 
was very relevant in recent years.  It pushed Coptic Christians to withdraw from 
politics and heightened religious tensions  (Stacher, 2011).  
Mubarak created his own coalition of NDP hierarchy, security services and 
powerful businessmen. This patronage network preserved the president’s power 
especially when faced and opposed by protests, strikes, political activists, media, and 
most importantly the Muslim Brotherhood (Stacher, 2011). In particular, the security 
services preserved Mubarak’s façade of political stability (Stacher, 2011). Due to 
that stability, the president invested in this specific sector more than housing or 
health.  
 
3.4.2 -The Economy 	  
Egypt’s economy started to open up when Sadat came to power and later 
under Mubarak. In the 1990s, Mubarak initiated economic reforms to strengthen 
Egypt’s power and to ensure a long-term stability. The regime introduced some 
structural reforms. At a gradual pace and following Sadat’s steps, Mubarak started by 
privatization and trade liberalization, as discussed earlier in this chapter (Paciello, 
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2007). Unfortunately, the reforms benefited the multinational corporations, who 
seized Egyptian assets. At some point, the state failed to manage the privatization 
process and to assure the required transparency (Hassan, 2011).  
In 2004, Mubarak pursued a remarkable economic program and some 
reforms. Under Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, he accelerated the path of 
liberalization and privatization (Wurzel, 2009). The latter cases were capable of 
attracting the needed foreign investment that led to an increase in GDP growth.  The 
reforms were applied without harming the interest of the ruling elites, regime 
supporters or the military institutions (Heydemann, 2007). Reforms were used to 
distribute privileges to important segments of Egyptian society, politicians and well-
connected businessman (Wurzel, 2009). Despite the reforms that took place, the 
Egyptians’ living condition remained significantly bad. Economic growth benefited 
Mubarak and his elites. The promised and needed wealth distribution did not occur. 
Mubarak’s policies and reforms enriched very corrupt elite, at the expense of a weak 
class and poor workers.  
Historically, from 1992 until 2010, Egypt’s average annual GDP growth5 
reached its peak level period 2008-2009. In March 2008, it reached an all time high 
of 7.30 percent growth. But since then, it started fluctuating at a low level of 3.8 at 
the beginning of 2011. The figure below shows economic growth trend of the last 10 
years taking into account the period following the revolution. The 2011-2012 will be 
discussed later in chapter 4. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5Unlike the commonly used quarterly GDP growth rate the annual GDP growth rate takes 
into account a full year of economic activity, thus avoiding the need to make any type of 
seasonal adjustment.  
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Figure 3.1 Egypt GDP Annual growth rate (Trading economics, 2012) 
 Moreover, the inflation rate rose in the last two of years. The figure below 
addresses the inflation rate from 2001 until the beginning of 2011. (Data has been 
taken from CIA Factbook and the International Monetary Fund) . 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
2.42% 2.43% 3.21& 8.1% 8.8% 4.1% 10.9% 11.7% 16.2%  11.7% 13.3% 
 
Table 3.1 Inflation rates 
 The inflation rate in Egypt since 2001 took an increasing trend with several 
double- digit episodes.  According to the IMF, the high inflation rates of 2007 
onwards were partly due to the rigidities and distortions in price and wage settings 
(Moriyama, 2011). The unemployment rates in Egypt have also remained inflexibly 
high. The figure 3 below shows how the rate ranged from 8 to 11 %. Since 1990, 
Egypt has been facing major economical structural changes, a number of external 
shocks and some governmental reforms. Reforms induced by Mubarak raised 
economic growth in Egypt, yet the unemployment rate remained high. A shift took 
place in 2004-2005 when another economic program was implemented. According to 
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CAPMAS6, more than two million new jobs were created between 2004 and 2007. 
Thus, the unemployment rate declined during that period to reach 9 percent. Yet, 
problems remained with another two million still out of work (Hasan & Sansapour, 
2011). 
 
Figure 3.2 Egypt Unemployment rates (Trading economics, 2012) 
According to the UNDP Annual report 2008 on Egypt, around 20 percent of 
citizens lived below the poverty line. Moreover, at least 14.7 percent of Egyptians 
children skip school and start working at a very young age (UNDP, 2008).  
But while the government proved inefficient in responding to people’s needs, 
the Muslim brotherhood and other silent parties filled the gap by helping citizens 
(Hassan, 2011), 
 
3.4.3- The Military 	  
During the Mubarak era, the military sector was very important in controlling 
the regime and ensuring its stability. It was one of the main institutions of the 
Egyptian regime. Throughout the years, the army responded to the president’s needs. 
The army was considered as Mubarak’s main institutional support especially when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 CAPMAS: Central Authority for Public Mobilization and Statistics  
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facing extremists (Cook, 2007). Officers became “a vital part of the state elites”. 
(Goodson & Radwan, 1997) 
The military was also privileged in controlling large assets of the national 
economy. Upon assuming power, Mubarak portrayed the military as a main engine 
for economic growth. Under Mubarak’s rule, the military owned industrial and 
agricultural factories. Robert Springbord (1989) has noted that: 
“There is a horizontal expansion in the role of the military into the national 
economy. The military's role in Egypt's economy is represented in four 
primary sectors: military industries, civilian industries, agriculture, and 
national infrastructure” 
 
As a result, throughout the years, the military economic power succeeded in 
strengthening Mubarak’s patronage system (Droz-vincent, 2011). Moreover, the 
military role was important in severe crises. That role dates back to 1986 when the 
army interfered to stop a rebellion of the Central Security Forces. It stood up to any 
militant Islamic threat.   
However Cook (2007) notes “The army was ruling but not governing in 
recent years”.  Hosni Mubarak considerably reduced the role of the military in 
governance. In fact, a 2001 study showed that the Mubarak ministerial appointees 
accounted for only 8 percent of the military (Ouda, Al Borai & Saada, 2001). This 
number is surprising especially that under the rule of former presidents Nasser and 
Sadat the percentage of military officers in cabinet was much higher.  
 
3.4.4- Civil Society 	  
The concept of civil society emerged in 1821. It was a group of students 
under the leadership of Mohammad Ali calling for the rights of the new middle class 
that flourished at that time. From 1882 until 1922, the Egyptian civil society worked 
for the confrontation of the colonial rule. The civil society developed trade unions, 
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parties, chambers of commerce, feminist lobby and enterprises. The phase after 1922 
until 1952 was marked by a flourishing civil society. The latter was capable of 
flourishing to produce 80 daily newspapers. They all had the same discourse; 
transparency, accountability, free elections and basic rights (ICLN, 2011). 
When Nasser came to power, almost all power and authority was vested in 
the hands of a small elite. Civil society was constrained by the emergence of a 
“corporatist populist regime” (Hassan, 2009, p.68). The state dominated all civil 
society when it formulated the law of 1964 (ICLN, 2011). The latter gives the state 
the ability to “refuse the creation, dissolution, or amalgamation of any civil 
association without response to the judiciary” (Hassan, 2011, p.7).  
In recent years, under Mubarak’s rule, civil society in Egypt consisted of 
around 30,000 organizations. Most of them were religious associations, trade and 
industry chambers, youth and social clubs, professional syndicates and only 24 
legally registered political parties (Hassan, 2011). Although new parties did exist, a 
true multiparty democratic system remained alusive in Egypt. The Political Party 
Affairs Committee accepted only two parties, Al-Umma party and the Al-Wifak 
party. The other parties used courts to get their license. The judiciary thus played an 
important role in creating the system of political parties (Abdul Rahman, 2002).  
Moreover, opposition parties were doomed very weak. They were circled by 
boundaries and limits. Moreover, some of those parties relied on government 
subsidies or public sector advertisements to make their revenues (Hassan, 2011). The 
Mubarak regime succeeded in creating a financial dependence leaving political 
parties always independent. In 2002, law number 84 was introduced in order to 
control the funds and finances of the NGOs. The latter could not accept or receive 
any sort of fund without Mubarak’s government authorization (Hassan, 2011).  
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Relation between syndicates, trade unions and interest groups took a patron-
client dynamic. The right to strike was forbidden. The government also allowed a 
very limited number of businessman associations. Although they had some 
independence from the state, they were coopted by the government and linked to the 
Mubarak regime. They strongly believed in the government’s liberalization policies 
(Hassan, 2011).  
By 2004, anti-regime protests started in Egypt with the creation of the 
Egyptian Movement for Change (Kefaya) and its slogan “No to extension or to 
inheritance or corruption”.  It was the first time that the protests criticized the ruling 
family and the regime (Hassan, 2011). Later, another protest took place in factories 
calling for the improvement of the working and living conditions. And the third one 
started in 2008. It was a youth protest group of 70,000 members who debated on 
Facebook about numerous topics:  free speech, nepotism, and stagnant economy 
(Hassan, 2011) . 
For many years, Mubarak retained dependent on the security apparatus and 
on manipulating the political process.  By setting economic and legal obstacles, 
Mubarak was able to control and contain civil society, but not forever. The various 
political trends were left weakened and could not achieve their goal (Hassan, 2011). 
They suffered from a lack of internal democracy and organization (Holger, 2005). 
Political opposition remained weak especially after being repressed, harassed, 
electorally manipulated and threatened. The emergency law that was implemented in 
1981 helped Mubarak’s regime to prohibit strikes and apply censorship on 
newspapers and media in the name of state security. However, this did not protect the 
regime from a popular uprising.  
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3.4.5- External influences 	  
 F. Gregory Gause (1992) has suggested “ Outside powers have consistently 
supported, at times with military force, the regional status quo, the sovereignty, 
statecraft and stability in the Middle East” (p.455). 
External actors helped authoritarian Arab regimes remain stable. In 
particular, the connection that bounds Egypt and the international system could 
easily determine its behavior in the development process. Since 1990, Egypt 
accepted the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank for the implementation of reform economic program. The latter was based on 
privatizations and other policies that weakened the society, both economically and 
politically (Korayem, 1997).  
As for the West, the US and the EU supported the survival of Mubarak 
regime. They did not demand reforms in order to destabilize the regime and the 
region (Durac, 2009) .The EU action plan did not force Egypt to change any 
regressive law. They just called for the need of vital political participation and fair 
elections. The US and the EU acted passively towards the repression of Islamic 
actors (Balfour &Cugusi, 2010). They sided with the regime in the name of fighting 
Islamic extremism. 
 Egypt under Mubarak was also among the biggest recipients of US aid. The 
relations between the United States and Egypt were considered to be special since 
they combined the usage of the carrot and the stick (Ibrahim, 2000). Due to the 
importance of Egypt’s location, the United States ought to give Cairo a regional role. 
 	  	  
	  
 
 50	  
 
3.5 – Conclusion 	  
 This chapter described the veil of regime stability that was covering Egypt 
under Mubarak. Since 1981, Mubarak succeeded in disposing his ultimate authority 
to maintain complete control politically, socially and economically. As a result, the 
opposition remained weak for many decades.  It was quite impossible to predict the 
2011 uprising or the actual defeat of Mubarak’s extensive security apparatus. The 
sudden collapse of Mubarak and his ruling NDP, utterly shocked Egyptians and the 
international scene. The next chapter treats the uprising of 2011 in relation to the 
theories of authoritarian regime breakdown.  	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CHAPTER 4 	  
REGIME BREAKDOWN IN EGYPT 
AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS 
 
4.1- Introduction 	  
This chapter opens with a description of the Arab Spring highlighting the 
important events regarding Egypt. Second, the chapter explains the concept of 
revolution and compares it to Egypt. Third, It explores the variables of Valerie 
Bunce and Barbara Geddes and fits them to the Egyptian case. An analysis is 
conducted to test whether the variables occurred in Egypt. If the latter variables 
actually took place, then the first process in the democratization phase was 
successful.  
 
4.2- The Arab Spring 	  
 November 7, 2010 marked a shift in the Arab World history. It all started in 
Tunis when a desperate street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself. This 
specific event alerted Tunisians and took them into the streets. The latters were filled 
with demonstrations, protests, national upheavals and later a full-fledged revolution. 
Tunisians were able to topple the longstanding authoritarian regime. That was just 
“the greatest Arab transformation in memory” (Bishara, 2012, p.5).   
 Bouazizi and the Tunisian success indirectly pushed Arab nations to go to 
streets. It broke a very long Arab silence.  Through decades, the region was filled 
with fear and injustice. The Arabs woke up with a new spirit of collective vigor and 
need for change. The Tunisian revolution stirred the region for possible change that 
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could happen; it was an old dream not applicable in the Middle East. The revolution 
was the needed incentive and most importantly the spark for the Arabs in demanding 
democracy.   
 After Tunis, the story continued with some young Egyptians who met on 
Facebook and twitter to bring the people into the streets. The role of technology in 
boosting the youth was compared to the same role of Dutch conglomerate Philips the 
inventor portables cassettes in the Iranian Islamic revolution (Bishara, 2012). Tunis 
and Egypt are similar in a way that both rulers had been in place for so long. In 
addition, they both ensured the containment of the opposition and were dependent on 
the West for stability (El Amrani, 2011).  
 Egypt witnessed mass protests that forced the Egyptian president, Hosni 
Mubarak, to step down. The historian Jared Diamond explained why great societies 
and powerful leaders fall in remarkably short periods of time as a consequence of the 
arrogance and recklessness of its leader (Senge, 2006).  Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, and 
Mubarak were not an exception. They followed the same pattern.  
The Arab Spring wave, that crossed Egypt, revealed the in-sustainability of 
the Egyptian strong political and economic system.  The 11th of February- the fall of 
Mubarak- marked an important date in the Egyptian history. But is it a step toward 
democratization or just a short-lived dream? This chapter thus will highlight the 
events of the Egyptian uprisings, will clarify the concept of revolution and will study 
the factors that signal authoritarian regime breakdown. If the factors do apply, then 
Egypt is on the right track towards democratization.  
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4.3- The Egyptian Uprising 	  
 It started on the 25th of January, the Police Day, when tens of thousands of 
Egyptians protested in Cairo, more specifically in Tahrir Square, calling for the 
resignation of the long time ruler Hosni Mubarak. The Police Day was a national 
holiday and it was celebrated by marches all along Egypt. Protesters specifically 
launched their movement on this day.  The latter marked a day of protest against the 
brutal measures employed by the policy and security forces against demonstrators in 
recent years (El Amrani, 2011).  
Using different social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, protesters 
coordinated to meet every day. Tens of thousands and later hundreds of thousands 
gathered at the central of Cairo. They were armed with courage, a feature present all 
along the upheavals.  At first, Mubarak proposed some concessions and promised not 
to run again for presidency. But the protesters were stubborn and strongly believed in 
their cause. On the 11th of February, and after being faced by an undefeatable 
domestic pressure, Mubarak stepped down. Vice President Omar Suleiman declared 
the president resignation. Hosni Mubarak transferred power to the Military Council. 
Although it was not constitutionally legal, the council was seen as the best option to 
control the situation.  
 The protesters were faced by a very harsh and cruel confrontation from the 
police and the pro-Mubarak forces.  Tahrir Square was surrounded by chaotic and 
tumultuous demonstrations and protests, never seen since 1981 and ultimately; the 
unexpected Egyptian military joined the Arab Spring wave (UCDP, 2011).  
 Hosni Mubarak and his ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) collapsed 
suddenly after 30 years of power and control. As mentioned in previous chapters, no 
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one predicted the defeat of Mubarak’s strong extensive security apparatus. No one 
could imagine that the military could stand with the protesters calling for change.  
The Mubarak regime remained in power for the 30 years and collapsed in just 
18 days. The internal structure of this powerful regime was not able to slow down the 
heated mass protests and few reforms in action were not enough to reduce the 
pressure. In the last few years, Hosni Mubarak was busy falsifying elections, fighting 
protesters and activists, preparing his son Gamal for next presidency, and gaining 
more power though corruption. Those events distracted the regime from political 
agitations that was slowly able to overthrown the regime. Hosni Mubarak could not 
resist the mass mobilization in January 2011 and collapsed.  
 Before studying the variables of the transition, one ought to understand 
whether the Egyptian uprising can be called a revolution.  
 
4.4- Is The Egyptian Uprising a Democratic Revolution? 	  
4.4.1- Defining Egypt’s Revolution 	  
 Scholars assess revolutions using two methods. One tends to measure a 
revolution by its successes and achievements and the other look at the process, not 
the final outcome. Since the Egyptian revolution is still in process, we will be only 
studying the events and the processes that took place.  
 Theda Skocpol (1994) defines revolutions as “rapid basic transformations of 
a society’s state and class structures, accompanied and in part accomplished through 
popular revolts from below”. She then elaborates that usually, activists seek to break 
down the old structure, but protests are not only the tools to do so. Most importantly, 
there ought to be certain institutions or philosophies to politically mobilize the 
masses. The role of institutions and ideology significantly take part in the 
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revolutionary analysis. Skocpol also notes that the idea of a revolution is subject to 
change from one period to another.  
 In studying the Egyptian case, one ought to consider the following. To begin, 
Egypt was enduring an ongoing crisis.  Top-down political reforms failed to subject 
any desired change. Last elections were rigged and corrupted. Other elements can be 
referred to as: repression, networking sites, the introduction of neoliberal policies, 
high prices of food namely bread, unemployment and traditional obligations ( 
Sallam, 2011). At first, Egypt’s revolution demanded basic social and economic 
needs, any other society can legally address. The situation in Tunis influenced Egypt 
and awakened the people to stand up against the oppression they had endured since 
1952. Thus mass protests and sits-ins took place in Tahrir Square asking for the 
breakdown of Mubarak’s regime. But are those enough for a revolution to be 
achieved?  
 Well, rather than gathering for their common demands for bread, freedom 
and justice, they gathered in January 2011 because of their common hatred towards 
Hosni Mubarak and his government (Tadros, 2012). Also, structural institutions and 
a “main character” were absent in the Egyptian revolutionary platform. Even though 
some refer to Khaled Said similar to Bou Azizi in Tunis, the Arab Spring lacked the 
teachings or political ideas or speeches of a leader, who promises change and sets a 
plan for the many years to come (West, 2011). According to Cannistraro (2011), 
what happened in Egypt is considered to be a partial awakening. There was no 
philosophical basis and a successful revolution requires more than just debates in 
Tahrir Square (Cannistraro, 2011). 
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4.4.2- A Revolution’s Three Phases 	  
According to Michael Kimmel (1990), a revolution is “ an attempt by 
subordinate groups to transform the social foundations of political power” (p.1). 
Thus, a revolution is different from coups, or rebellions. The revolution is also 
formed of sequences of events over a certain period of time and can include hawkish 
and dovish system of change (Richard, 1966). This definition implies the 
classification of the events that happened in Tunis and Egypt as revolutions.   
 The Arab Spring portrays the first uprisings in the region. Through the fifties 
and sixties, some Arab regimes were overthrown by military coups “inquilab”. 
Although those coups were labeled as revolutions or “thawra”, the change only took 
place in the governing elite.  
However, the Arab Spring touched the underprivileged classes and positively 
changed the Arab image. As Rashid Khalidi (2011) argued, “Suddenly, to be an Arab 
has become a good thing. People all over the Arab world feel a sense of pride in 
shaking off decades of cowed passivity under dictatorships that ruled with no 
deference to popular wishes” (p.1).  
Michael Kimmel (1990) explains revolution as sequences of three phases. 
The first phase is called the ‘preconditions’. It symbolizes the “longer-run, structural 
shifts in the social foundations of the society”(p.1). The ‘precipitants’, which 
identifies the shorter-run historical events, is the second phase. Those events set 
down strong structural forces capable of getting stronger and of mobilizing existing 
discontents. The final phase is known as ‘the triggers’. The latter describes instant 
historical events, which ‘set the revolutionary process in motion’. (Kimmel, 1990, 
p.10) 
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Thus, according to Kimmel, Egypt’s recent events can be glorified and 
classified as a revolution. Well, this country first witnessed the first phase; the 
preconditions. In 1950s, authoritarian rule began and lasted throughout Mubarak’s 
long rule. The last thirty years enabled the consolidation of military-elites reign 
through guarantees from the Constitution, emergency laws and balance of power. 
Since 1950s, Egypt witnessed a dramatic increase in its population. It shifted from 
21.4 to 83 million people today. This caused high level of unemployment and bad 
health and educational services. These preconditions created the right atmosphere for 
a revolutionary situation (Winckler, 2008).   
We identify few precipitants while studying the situation in Egypt. In 2005, 
Hosni Mubarak amended the constitution and called for democratic elections. He 
also prepared and trained his son Gamal for future ‘enthronement’. But during that 
time, Egyptian Movement for Change “Enough” or, “Kifaya,” were eager for new 
developments and change. With time, the popularity of Mubarak’s regime started to 
decrease. Second, 2010 elections eliminated the presence of the opposition. As 
opposed to the 2005 elections with 88 members, the Muslim Brotherhood did not get 
any members elected in year 2010 (MEMRI, 2010). Elections became more 
corrupted and signaled public distrust. Third, since 2004, more than 1900 strikes 
took place throughout Egypt.  According to John Beinin study (2009), since 1998, 
around two million workers took part in more than 2500 strikes.  Workers all around 
Egypt feared the privatization process and were eager to improve their living 
condition. They were facing a very high cost of living and low salary. Food costs 
rose by twenty-five percent between 1997 and 2007 with no increase in the low 
Egyptian monthly wage. Last but not least, in 2008, the “6 April” movement and the 
National Movement for Change led by Muhammad El-Baradei emerged. These new 
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movements were created at the time when a large strike in a textile plant in Mahala 
al- Kubra took place. Interestingly enough, this movement was designed through 
social media networks since the government heavily controlled the press.   
As for the revolutionary trigger, it was the mass demonstrations of Tunisia, 
which started on the 14th of January 2011. No one predicted the fall of the Mubarak’s 
regime. The outcome was facilitated by the fact that Mubarak was very slow to react 
and did not take firm decision to crush the riots. The media’s coverage of events 
further inflamed the masses.  
Although, the definitions of revolution do not strictly apply to Egypt’s case, 
the fact that Egypt passed throughout the three phases means that the uprisings can 
be defined as revolutions.   
 
4.4.3- A Democratic Revolution?  	  
“In a revolution, as in a novel, the most difficult part to invent is the end” (De 
Tocqueville, 1896).  
 
When a revolution occurs, does it mean that democracy should occur? Well, 
in general those two phenomena are unrelated. In history, many revolutions 
happened with a shy connection to democratic motives. Those usually are referred to 
coup d’états that replace one elite with another. Some are created in the service of a 
democratic desire. 
As for Egypt, since independence, they failed to develop an ideology or a 
school of thought. And today, they are facing this challenge. In the context of the 
Arab Spring, numerous questions have emerged regarding the aspect of the 
revolution in Egypt. Egyptians awaited revolution and it finally did happen. The 
change of 2011 was not the events in Tunisia. They change was with the Egyptians’ 
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ability to finally coordinate their efforts, link the socioeconomic problems with 
political demands and protest all together.  
But will they be able to successfully develop a democratic project? The Arab 
Revolutions did not occur through coups, but rather by oppressed, burdened and 
scared masses that broke finally the barrier of silence.  
They are eager for democracy promotion. But will this experience succeed? 
Egypt is standing before a transitional period where what is happening is critical. 
After Mubarak’s resignation and the election of a new president, will the revolting 
masses succeed in improving the systems and in forming democratic pillars?  
4.6- Studying Regime Breakdown in Egypt  	   “There are no miraculous events here, but many years of concerted action” (Kenney, 
2006, p.16) 
 
 Taking the fact that to study a revolution, we should analyze its effects after a 
decade, this chapter studies the first phase of a democratic revolution. Although the 
events in Egypt can be described as a revolution, this does not mean that democracy 
emerged. As discussed in chapter two, democratization requires three important 
steps; regime breakdown, democratization and democracy consolidation. And since 
the Egyptian revolution is still fresh, our focus will be on the regime breakdown 
phase. The latter highlights the beginning of the transition from dictatorship to 
democracy that starts by a weakening of the authoritarian rule and ends with the first 
competitive elections (Bunce, 2006).  
For a regime breakdown to occur, some variables need to exist. Those 
variables as mentioned in chapter 2, will be deduced from Valerie Bunce and 
Barbara Geddes. Some of them are intertwined and thus in this part all the variables 
will be studied ; poverty, economic development, splits in the system, pacts between 
elites, popular protest, exogenous shocks, immediate influences and nationalism. 
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The figure below summarizes some useful indicators describing Egypt’s 
general condition and ranking.  Those indicators will be highlighted by the variables 
later in that section.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Egypt's indicators 
Indicators Egypt 
GDP per capita 5,860 
GDP growth 5.1 % 
Unemployment rate 9.7 % 
Population under 25 years 52.3 % 
Poverty rate 20.00 % 
Democracy (ranking) 138 
Corruption (ranking) 115 
Press freedom (rating) 60 
HDI (ranking) 101 
 
 
4.6.1- Poverty 	  
According to Barbara Geddes, poverty is classified as an important predictor 
for transitions. Based on many academic studies, poverty predicts a regime 
breakdown and a transition to democracy. The causes of the French revolution can be 
given as an example to explain how poverty can motivate the masses towards 
revolution.  
Moreover, many academic scholars such as Jackman (1973), Bollen (1979), 
Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Londregan and Poole (1990) and Przeworski 
(1997) strongly argue that the best predictor of transition is poverty.  
Well, as witnessed by many, one of the causes of the Egyptian revolution was 
acrimonious poverty. Around 20 percent live below 2 $ a day, which is considered 
below the poverty line (UNDP, 2010).  Compared to other Third World countries, 
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Egypt belongs to the most successful of these nations (UNDP, 2010); However, 
through his rule, Mubarak managed to eradicate extreme poverty7 in Egypt.  
According to the Gini8 coefficient scale, Egypt is the 92nd country that is 
considered unequal and suffers from inadequate access to the basic needs (World 
Data Bank, 2011). The UNDP report on Egypt (2010) studied the issue of the young 
poor in rural and urban Egypt. They reported that 44 percent of youth in rural Upper 
Egypt are considered to be very poor, 22.7 percent in upper urban, 19.3 percent in 
lower rural and 8.8 percent in lower urban region (UNDP, 2010). The report notes 
that poverty is the highest among teenagers between 15 to 17 years reaching 29 
percent (UNDP, 2010).  
The UNICEF report on child poverty in Egypt (2010) examined severe 
deprivation in health, education, shelter, nutrition, water, and sanitation sectors 
(UNDP, 2010). 47 percent of children are considered poor. The poverty of youth at 
the backyard of urban Cairo accumulated economic and even social grievances 
leading to the active figures in January 2011.  
According to Bayat (2009), poor slums surrounding the urban districts in 
Cairo represent the main bulk of the population. They passively interact and once 
faced with a common threat, they actively start networking . In January 2011, they 
became a convincing, overpowering, prevalent and hardly controllable force of 
change. And poverty played an effective role in sizing up a massive nation-wide 
revolution.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Extreme poverty: less than 1.25 $ a day income  
8 Gini Coefficient - measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption 
expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution 
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4.6.2- Economic Development  	  
Poor economic performance highlights hope for authoritarian breakdown. 
That reveals the importance of low economic development to trigger a revolution. 
Both Geddes and Bunce stress on economic growth indicators to predict an 
authoritarian regime breakdown. On the short term, the weak economic performance 
accelerates transition.  
During Mubarak’s reign, the Egyptian economy took a developing path. 
Egypt witnesses a growth of 4.5 percent during the last thirty years. That was 
considered one of best results among the Third World Countries (Korotayev, 2009). 
Growth was accelerated especially after 2004 when Mubarak introduced economic 
reforms. The success of reforms was reflected in the improvement of investor’s 
perception of the business environment (Nasr, 2007).  
Mubarak’s reign has succeeded in achieving substantial development. The 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank praised the regime for achieving a 
GDP growth of 7 percent (Naguib, 2011). But after 2008, a setback was noticed in 
the reform programs. For decades, Mubarak’s regime attracted foreign investments 
and engaged in a privatization policy. But the crisis of 2008 made it impossible for 
ordinary Egyptians to feel any benefit from the country’s economic growth and 
reforms. Despite the latter, before the 25th of January, “the economy in Egypt as a 
whole was performing better than ever” (Bakr, 2011, p.58).  
Despite the facts that the graph shows good economic development, the gap 
between the rich and poor was enormous. Although economic development was 
significantly high, the government failed to translate growth into poverty reduction. 
Numbers and graphs are shown in chapter 3. In addition, one of the major 
weaknesses of the growth was the small amount of respective growth of labor 
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productivity. Unemployment reached 9.7 percent (Bakr, 2011) and Mubarak 
succeeded in marginalizing large sectors of the society. 
 Quantitative data shows significant growth in GDP. But “neoliberal growth 
rates hide the unequal distribution of growth” (Naguib, 2011, p. 3). A tiny minority 
mainly formed of elites benefited from the produced wealth, and the majority 
suffered growing unemployment and poverty. Egypt, which was highly dependent on 
wheat import, suffered from a sharp rise in the costs of basic foods, mainly bread. 
The annual food price inflation shifted from 17.2 percent in December 2010 to 18.9 
percent prior to the revolution (Naguib, 2011). The events in Egypt were similar to 
the ones in Morocco and Oman in 1848 and to the ones of the Soviet Union in 1989. 
Those previous political tremors also witnessed a high unemployment and rising 
food prices. (Goldstone, 2011) 
The economic performance of Mubarak’s regime was so fragile, capable of 
creating the 25th of January 2011. Thus it weakened the regime to the point that J-
Curve9 hit Egypt (Bremmer, 2011). This concept was at the bulk of Alexis de 
Tocqueville analysis on the French Revolution and is later emphasized by James 
Davies (1969) and his J-curve theory of Revolution (Fukuyama, 2011).  He argued 
that “A prolonged period of rising expectations and gratifications is followed by a 
short period of sharp reversal during which the gap between expectations and 
gratifications quickly widens and become intolerable, resulting in revolution” 
(p.690). 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “The J-curve effect is a phenomenon in which a period of negative or unfavorable returns is followed 
by a gradual recovery that stabilizes at a higher level than before the decline. The progression of this 
phenomenon appears as a "J" shape on a time-series graph. Economic analysts and policymakers may 
factor the J-curve effect into their analyses and decisions as a way to gauge both short- and long-term 
effects of a variable change (for example, a decline in exchange rates) or new policy.” (Investing 
Answers, 2012)  
	  
 
 64	  
 
4.6.3- Splits in The System 	  
First, we should clarify the splits in the system and pacts between elites are 
intertwined variables used by Barbara Geddes and Valerie Bunce. Both authors study 
those variables in light of O’Donnell and Schmitter literature for transition.  
The optimal scenario for a successful transition implies a combination of two 
phases. The first requires a split between elites inside the old system and the second 
entails pacts between the regime liberals and “popular credible opposition” 
(O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986).  
This section describes the splits in the Egyptian system. The latter is 
highlighted when elites are divided and break the old structure. According to 
Huntington (1991), divided elites move the authoritarian regimes into a change, 
whether desirable or not. It increases the probability of democratic outcomes. Bunce 
illustrates the example of Spain and Poland, where the behavior of leaders was 
critical in the transition phase. The one in power and the other seeking power forge a 
certain situation influenced by the mass publics (Bunce, 2006). In this particular 
frame, elites are pictured as the long-term “summarizers” of development. (Bunce, 
2000, p. 707)  
 This variable was applicable to all three waves of democratization. When 
elites are divided, the probability to achieve democratization is high. With this 
scenario, it is a good indicator of authoritarian breakdown. Large social forces and 
elites in action are the causes of successful regime breakdown and at the same time, 
the hope for the new awaited democracy.  
 Hosni Mubarak was professional military man and became president with key 
backing from the armed forces. He is similar to some of Latin American dictators; 
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Juan Peron of Argentina, Manuel Odria of Peru, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, 
Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba and Rafael Trujillo 
of the Dominican Republic (Dix, 1982).  
 The weakening of the regime by the civilian opposition isolated the armed 
forces as they were called to suppress the rising of mass mobilization. And in Egypt, 
elites were divided. A split occurred. Along the years, Mubarak, like many dictators, 
went through “continuismo” (Dix, 1982, p.565), which means a self-perpetuation in 
office. This phenomenon makes the regime a vehicle of one person. Mubarak was 
capable of building a circle of personal power but could not rely on elites to stay in 
power. Some key military elites such as the defense minister Field Marshal Hussein 
Tantawi remained more or less loyal to him to the very end. They were afraid that 
the new order threatens their power.  
 Their decision not to order an attack against protesters in Tahrir Square 
during the revolution was not seen as a sign of support to the movement. They just 
sacrificed Hosni Mubarak in a way to save the system (Naguib, 2011). 
4.6.4- Pacts between Elites 	  
Pacts between elites accommodate various interests and promise the 
opposition power, influence and control (Hinnebusch, 2006).  
 Some have suggested that elites pacts are difficult to reach in the Middle 
East. Pacts are easier to occur “under relative social equality or rapid economic 
growth” (Hinnebusch, 2006, p.388). Since the Middle East lacks the required levels 
of growth and equality, it is much more difficult to negotiate pacts.   
  In Egypt, since the revolution started, and through a series of deceptions and 
conspiracies, the military council prevented any legitimate representation of the 
people.  The post- Mubarak era witnessed divisions between the Supreme Council of 
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the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Muslim Brotherhood. No pacts seemed to have 
occurred in Egypt.  
The SCAF became the ruling power after the fall of Mubarak. It wanted to 
guarantee power in its hands to sustain the old regime that they were and continue to 
be part of. At first, they were seen as the defenders of the Egyptian revolution, but 
the military’s role was double-edged (Saikal, 2011). They were also loyal to the old 
regime that they served for thirty years. The military’s role after the revolution was 
questioned. They were deeply criticized for their reluctance and tardiness in 
prosecuting Mubarak, and for their unwillingness to address economic problems. 
They were also accused of many human rights violations.  
At first, the SCAF and the MB agreed on removing Mubarak and on 
introducing constitutional amendments (Ahram, 2012). When the MB won a 
sweeping majority in the parliament, the SCAF attempted to control their power.   
Thus, on the eve of the presidential elections, and in order to maintain power 
and control, the SCAF issued five decrees. They started by dissolving the newly 
elected parliament, which had a Muslim Brotherhood majority. They transferred 
legislative power to the military council. They also enforced a law that allows 
members of the armed forces to arrest civilians. They formed a secretariat restraining 
all president power and created a higher council for defense formed by military 
personnel. However, the SCAF ultimately handed power recently to Morsy. It is not 
clear whether this took place after a pact between them was negotiated.  
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4.6.5- Popular Protest 	  
Wael Ghonim (2012) has noted that: “The power of the people is greater than 
the people in power”.  According to Freedom House, the most successful transitions 
to democracies start with mass protests and strikes. That was illustrated in the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia 
(Bunce, 2006). Mass protests, demonstrations and sit-ins usually signal the beginning 
of an authoritarian regime breakdown. They create a large opposition united to 
overthrow the incumbent regime. They are the tools for the “founding and 
consolidation of democracy” (Bunce, 2003, p. 170).  
The events that shocked Tunisia in early 2011 were not new developments. 
Over the past years, the Arab Middle East was subject to a wave of protests, strikes 
and demonstrations. Since the various organizations involved had different 
constituencies, and demands, the absence of large cohesive movements helped 
authoritarian leaders to stay in power.  
From 1998 until 2004, the Egyptian government faced more than 1000 strikes 
(Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011). A sudden increase took place in 2004 and 2005 when 
an accelerated economic liberalization program was introduced. The Kefaya 
movement which was formed by intellectuals seeking political reforms, failed to 
mobilize protesters and reach workers. In 2006, the number of strikes and protests 
was 222, whereas it more than doubled in 2007 to reach 580 (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 
2011). In recent years, strikes were called for industrial and agricultural workers’ s 
rights rather than political gains. 
After 2005, political movements and groups acknowledged their failure to 
produce change. Consequently, socioeconomic protests increased. A massive strike 
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took place on 6 April 2008. Young activists, workers, public servants, and formal 
and informal opposition groups led the huge strike. Demonstrations and strikes 
expanded from Cairo and Alexandria to Al-Mahalla Al-Kubra. Protesters called for 
economic reforms and political change. However, this exceptional strike did not last 
for more than one day and failed to be reproduced (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011) The 
Muslim Brotherhood, the Kifaya Movement and the Tagammu Party were not 
allowed to be involved. Various groups had different demands but without a single 
purpose.  
In 2009, around one thousand strikes covered the urban centers in Egypt. In 
the first half of 2010, 300 strikes were organized. All called for higher wages, better 
public services, improved transportation and again, asked for the elimination of 
corruption, torture, and arbitrary detainment and for the establishment of a just 
judicial system. The government responded to some of the protesters needs and 
indirectly shut down political protests. Thus political parties coordination was 
limited.  
On June 2010, two members of the secret police officers tortured to death a 
twenty-eight years old Egyptian from Alexandria named Khalid Mohammad Said. 
The way he was murdered exposed regime atrocities. Khalid Said’s death and this 
injustice gathered Egyptians on Facebook who were eager to extract justice for him. ( 
Ghonim, 2012)  
The blog “Kullena Khalid Said” gathered people online in 2010 and later 
onto the streets in 2011. Tunis events triggered the 25th of January 2011. Wael 
Ghonim noted on his Facebook page the following: 
“I never saw this on Facebook before… the Jan25 invitation reached 500,000 
Facebook users … 27,000 have RSVPed… the important thing now is to 
spread out to streets, factories, mosques and churches...” (Ghonim, 
2012,p.60) 
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The ultimate day of the 25th of January 2011 gathered tens of thousands 
(Ottaway, Hamzawy, 2011) It was just the beginning of a desired revolution. That 
day was not completely a new development, but a dramatic example of a culminating 
unrest of the past few years. In Egypt, political protest flourished on three occasions; 
one around 2005 parliamentary elections, April 6th 2008 and during the 2010 
elections. And the 25th of January 2011 was seen as a significant shift in Egypt. 
Protesters went through 18 days of unrest in order to topple the regime on the 11th of 
February 2011. A rising middle class yearning for economic and political change 
leads the protests.  
 Mass protests did take place in Egypt. This various political groups with 
nothing in common, gathered together to overthrow the pharaoh. Since then, 
Egyptians are split and do not have a common leader, nor philosophy or a common 
future. Egypt is enduring difficult social and economic conditions coupled with a 
weak society.  The challenge is for protesters to coordinate their efforts and link their 
socioeconomic needs with their political demands when they are facing no dream in 
common.  
 
4.6.6- Exogenous Shocks 	  
Exogenous shocks are described by Barbara Geddes as geopolitical or 
economically based. They force regimes to negotiate transitions away from power. 
Shocks have the power to prevent good economic performance, distribution of 
benefits. They also destroy the regime’s coercive machine. Geddes highlights the 
power of external shocks in the breakdown of authoritarian regime (Geddes, 1999). 
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At the time of the uprising, Egypt was not faced with geopolitical or 
economic shocks. Geopolitically, Egypt has been known for its essential vital 
position in the Middle East. Its location facilitates its control over the Sinai 
Peninsula, which is the only land bridge joining the African and Eastern landmasses. 
Egypt is also known for its Nile waters. It has historical ties with Sudan, Uganda and 
Zaire. Israel, on its side, used to pose a threat to Egyptian security but the Camp 
David accords eased the situation.  There were only sudden economic shocks such as 
the second oil crisis of 1970s that hit 14 countries of Latin America (Geddes, 1999; 
138).   
 
4.6.7- Immediate Influence  	  
Immediate influences are events that have direct effect in nurturing the sense 
of revolution. In revolution, it often takes the form of diffusion. Diffusion is “a 
process where new ideas, institutions, policies, models or repertoires of behavior 
spread from their point to new sites”. That principle suggests a “coincidence of time 
and geography”. Taking the example of post-communist countries, mass protests 
started in one country and then moved to others (Bunce, 2006,p. 283) 
In the case of Egypt, diffusion was implied.  The events in Tunisia triggered 
the Egyptians uprising as, youth moved to the streets and demanded for the 
resignation of Mubarak. The Jasmine revolution of Tunis inspired Egyptians to call 
for the 25th of January 2011.  It signaled a new “permeability in Arab politics.  
The Tunisians victory sent a strong message to Egyptians eager to change 
their regime (Ghonim, 2012). This message broke the wall of fear and challenged 
their pride, since Egypt was always considered to be a leader in the region. The 
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Tunisian uprising was similar to the one of Egypt. Both mass movements were 
organized by urban lower middle-class youth using social media tools to coordinate.   
The media was as an instrument of regional diffusion. Numerous scholars 
such as Langman (2005), Wasserman (2007) and O’Lear (1999) argued that social 
media became a new resource for the successful organization of mass mobilization, 
protests, and social movements. In Egypt, new social media, like short messaging 
services (SMS), social-networking sites and blogs, played a vital role in creating 
successful anti-governments protests capable of overthrowing a solid regime. 
Facebook was a trigger for the uprisings.  
Egyptians had significant access to social media since Mubarak expanded the 
nation’s communication technology abilities as an instrument for socioeconomic 
progress.  In 1999, the government initiated free Internet access and promoted low-
cost computers (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). In 2010, around 21 percent of Egyptians 
had Internet access and more than 4.5 million used Facebook (Internet World Stats, 
2011). The diffusion of media introduced speed, interactivity, precise organization, 
which were missing in traditional mobilization techniques. Social media made 
Egyptians ‘citizen’s journalists’, especially after banning reporters from Tahrir 
Square (Fisher, 2011). This revolution was definitely nurtured online.  
Fearing his downfall, Mubarak cut off Internet and cellular phones during the 
uprising. Despite these measures, the flow of communication did not stop. Through 
this novel resource, Egyptians were linked to Tunisians, to the Egyptians abroad and 
to the outside world (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). Videos live from Tahrir Square, 
texts and images were shared online and were available to millions. Those were also 
reinforced and republished by news channel such as CNN and Al Jazeera.  
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4.6.8- Nationalism  	  
According to Bunce, there is a direct relationship between nationalism and 
democracy. A sense of nationalism makes the opposition strong and united. The 
regime breakdown appears successful when nationalist mobilization goes hand in 
hand with the weakening of the old regime and the founding of a new state (Bunce, 
2006). Since January 2011, there was a strong popular nationalist mobilization in 
Egypt. Egyptians suddenly reawakened their sense of nationalism and pride.  
 The target of the uprisings was the dictator who controlled power for decades 
and worked to have over power to his family. There was a simultaneous outbreak 
and revival of nationalism. Mubarak injured the national pride and the Arab Spring 
revitalized and rejuvenated it. The latter was used to be expressed in chauvinistic 
ways at football events for example. Throughout Mubarak’s years, the Egyptian 
culture allowed the hallmark of state centralization, subsidies and censorship (Colla, 
2012).  
 The causes that made up the Egyptian uprising defined the outline of a new 
Egyptian unity, based less on ethnic or racial thoughts than on a generally political 
stance. This new feeling forged in bloody battles against the regime, was compared 
to the Latin American sentiment. Egyptians developed through this uprising a strong 
sense of national identity and started to regain their stolen pride.  
On the streets and in Tahrir Square, no particular political party existed, nor a 
specific civil society group, ideological movement or social class. During the 
uprisings, many people from all walks of life protested because they had enough (El 
Amrani, 2011).  
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 Egyptians, from different parties, Muslim and Christians, gathered on 
Facebook and later on the streets “We are All Khalid Saiid”. This slogan represented 
the heterogeneous classes and factions of Egypt. The Facebook page was also not 
influenced by any political party and was not supported by a certain ideology 
(Ghonim, 2012). Supporters were just Egyptians suffering from depression, poverty, 
unemployment, corruption, absence of liberty and democracy.  
 Those who started the uprising were divided along four stands. The youth 
who launched the revolution through social media were fragmented into a number of 
coalitions and unions. The traditional political parties such as the Wafd and the 
Tajammu parties, who were the formal opposition to Mubarak’s regime, joined the 
anti-regime forces and accepted the leadership of the Muslim Brothers.  The latter 
also constitutes part of the traditional political opposition, and was divided among 
Salafis, Sufis, liberal Islamism and Radical Islamism (Said Aly, 2011). Various non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights groups and civil society 
organizations also joined the crowd.  
 Despite the different groups that gathered together, the Egyptian uprising was 
a nationalist uprising. Protests were peaceful, the Egyptian flag was the only one 
carried and chants were unified. All yelled “Al Sha‘b yurid isqat al-Nizam” (The 
people want to topple the regime) (Ghonim, 2012, p. 184). 
 
4.7- Conclusion 	  
 This chapter assessed the Egyptian’s revolution and analyzed the causes of 
the uprisings. It studied the variables of Valerie Bunce and Barbara Geddes that 
initiate a successful authoritarian regime breakdown. Egypt witnessed poverty, poor 
economic development, mass protests, and splits in the system, immediate influence 
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and sense of nationalism. Egypt was not subject to exogenous shocks and could not 
ensure pacts between elites once Mubarak resigned. Thus, can we talk about a 
successful regime breakdown? 
 But Geddes noted is that the process of democratization varies from country 
to country and region to region (Geddes, 1999). The variables, Geddes and Bunce 
studied, are proposed overviews that failed to accommodate all real-world 
differences. Evidence has shown that Egypt passed through most of the variables, but 
one ought to acknowledge that not enough time has passed to be certain. We also 
need to acknowledge that the Arab Middle East did not witness any of the waves of 
democratization. Thus, we have a new region, new countries, new decade and maybe 
new variables. Can we project our views to picture 2011 as a start of a fourth wave of 
democratization? 	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CHAPTER 5 	  
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1- General Findings and Conclusion 
 
This thesis examined the breakdown of authoritarianism in Egypt. Since no 
one predicted the Arab Spring, the whole academic world was surprised by the 
events that took place in Tunisia and later in Egypt. Scholars did not predict a 
revolution in the Arab World. They had rather focused on explaining the robustness 
of authoritarian regimes. Many researchers saw a democratic revolution as a rear 
impossible phenomenon in the Arab Middle East. The literature on authoritarianism 
in the Arab world was thus proven wrong. Young Tunisians overthrew their regime 
and Arabs started to dream and later, the wind of democratic revolution blew over 
Egypt.  
This thesis began with a brief introduction on the debate on stubborn 
authoritarianism in the Middle East. The endurance of authoritarianism in the Arab 
Middle East was explained from different perspectives; economic, cultural, 
institutional, social and international. Others explained authoritarianism and 
democratization as dependent on the choices of the regime and the opposition actors.   
After explaining the argument about the robustness of authoritarianism in the 
Arab world, the thesis focuses on authoritarian regime breakdown. Barbara Geddes 
and Valerie Bunce highlighted variables that initiate breakdown and transition 
towards democracy. They both provided a theoretical analysis based on case studies. 
Although, both noted that each region differs in its breakdown process, their 
common variables formed the basic ‘platform’ for regime breakdown. Those 
variables range from poverty, poor economic performance, splits in the system, and 
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pacts between elites, to popular protest, immediate influence, nationalism and 
exogenous shocks. The thesis then studied the Egyptian uprising in the light of the 
variables listed by Bunce and Geddes.   
Egypt endured the atrocities of authoritarianism from the late 1950s. To 
understand the Egyptian uprising, this thesis highlighted the period under 
authoritarianism since Nasser. Nasser made Egypt powerful domestically and 
capable of spreading its influence in the Arab World. He established an authoritarian 
regime, united the country under his leadership, and created a coercive system 
capable of controlling its civil society. In the 1970s, Sadat assumed power and Egypt 
was introduced to a new vision. To boost the economy, Sadat implemented economic 
reforms known as Infitah. He also introduced some new political reforms, endorsing 
some degree of political expression. In his last years, Egypt lost its status as a 
regional power after signing a peace treaty with Israel, and his rule grew more 
authoritarian.  
After Sadat’s assassination, Mubarak took power in 1981. He ensured 
regime’s survival through successfully using the authoritarian structure he inherited. 
He introduced economic and political reforms and was also capable of promoting the 
role of Egypt as a main regional power. He later assumed a de-liberalization path 
when opposition forces challenged regime control. Mubarak ruled like a monarch in 
Egypt. Mubarak and his ruling party, the NDP, controlled the government, the 
military, the economy and civil society.  He designed a very stable regime that 
seemed too powerful to break down. And then suddenly, in just 18 days, the pharaoh 
collapsed. 
  After focusing on Egypt’s authoritarian rulers, the thesis turned to the 
uprisings and the variables that led to authoritarian regime breakdown. The Egyptian 
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scene was ready for this kind of event. For those who knew the reality in Egypt, it 
was quite obvious that an uprising was the only possible way to end Mubarak’s 
tyranny. Most of the variables that Bunce and Geddes listed were examination of the 
Egyptian uprising. This helped examine the process of authoritarian breakdown in 
Egypt.   
 Beginning in January 2011, mass protests filled the streets of Cairo. 
Egyptians wanted to restore their pride and overthrew the regime. Tunisian’s 
uprising played an important role in the uprising of the youth of Egypt. And with the 
help of social media, they were capable of organizing on the 25th of January. 
Moreover, a sense of nationalism was forged and there was a hunger to restore 
Egyptian pride. These feelings were behind the success of the mass mobilizations 
against authoritarian rule. This sense of unity gathered all Egyptians together to 
topple Mubarak’s regime. The people of Egypt were facing poverty, unemployment, 
high inflation and corruption. In the last years, the prices of basic food products had 
increased and unemployment hit millions. High GDP rates were not reflected in the 
improvements of the Egyptians’ life and left a huge gap between the rich and the 
poor. Poor economic conditions, especially the high degree of poverty, made the 
authoritarian regime more vulnerable for breakdown. In addition to all of that, among 
the ruling elites, Egypt witnessed a division of elites. This situation made it more 
likely for the military to try to save the system rather than the person leading it.  
 This thesis studied Bunce and Geddes ‘s variables and applied them to Egypt 
uprising. Poverty, poor economic performance, immediate influence, nationalism, 
mass protests and divisions amongst elites were found in the Egyptian context. The 
thesis also shed light on other variables that were not present.  No pacts between the 
elites took place neither did geopolitical factors play a role nor was there economic 
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shocks just before the uprising. 
Although not all the variables occurred, this thesis concluded that a 
revolution did happen and an authoritarian breakdown occurred. This conclusion was 
strengthened by the fact that each region has its own specificities. Egypt did not copy 
paste the textbook model nor is similar to other authoritarian regimes.   
 The 2011 events in Egypt are best described as an uprising for democracy. 
Protesters were driven by a sense of hunger for pride, sovereignty, freedom, rule of 
law, equality and democracy. They succeeded by bringing down an authoritarian 
regime, however their movement is unfinished. There is a young, educated segment 
of society, the driving force of the uprisings, who are still motivated to establish a 
democratic rule. They just did not start to stop.  
 
5.2- Egypt’s New Course 
 
Egypt has a new president, Mohammed Morsi, a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. A great deal of concern about the future of Egypt has focused on the 
role the Muslim Brotherhood will have in the future. The youth of Egypt as well as 
the region, and the international community in general, is concerned about the 
political consequences for regional stability and international security. There is a 
feeling of anxiety surrounding the role that political Islam will play in the region, 
especially when a member of the Muslim Brotherhood became president of Egypt 
after its long waited revolution. 
Many fear that the Muslim Brotherhood may be deeply illiberal. Their 
commitment to democracy worries Egyptians. In 2007, they drafted a political 
platform advocating for a religious advisory council similar to the one in Iran in 
order to review legislation and whether it conforms to Islamic law (Hashemi, 2011).  
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They frequently oppose Western geopolitical interest in the Middle East. The 
Muslim Brotherhood did not win by chance in the last presidential election. Their 
supporters are the most dedicated, fanatical and eager to vote. They proved to be 
highly organized during the parliamentary elections. . There was a surprisingly low 
turnout for the first free and fair elections (Bradley, 2012).  
Morsi was elected under difficult circumstances.  More than 12 million voters 
supported his opponent Mohammad Shafik, Mubarak’s last prime minister. To 
successfully run a country, Morsi should seek national reconciliation and build 
bridges with the military, the liberals and the Copts. Thus, the new president has to 
distance himself from the Muslim Brotherhood and the radical ideology in order to 
represent all Egyptians. Once he assumed office, he invited liberals, young activists, 
Christians to join his new government (Coughlin, 2012).  
Today, Morsi is not only responsible for democratizing state institutions, 
organizing elections, and reforming the security system, but he ought to respond to 
the people’s demand for equality and socio-economic development. With this 
magnitude of challenges ahead, the future remains uncertain. The new president is 
also facing problematic relations with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF). The latter, fearing the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood, limited the 
president’s powers. After the dissolution of the parliament, the SCAF empowered its 
institution with legislative powers to ensure full command over army affairs, 
including the defense budget. It also has the final say regarding the declaration of 
war. These powers were later reversed by Morsi, as he assumed full executive 
control. 
Morsi also faces international challenges. His recognition of the state of 
Israel, and his policy towards the US, and the Persian Gulf states are critical to his 
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rule. Future foreign policies will be deeply divisive and controversial. The political 
stability of the region will depend on how Islamists behave in power.  
 
 
5.3- The Future of Egypt  
 
 Egypt’s future is still very much in the making. With the new election, and 
the current situation between the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood, the popular 
revolution seems to crack two central assumptions. On one hand, international actors 
became skeptical towards democratization in the region and define Arabs as not yet 
mature for democracy. On the other hand, many suggest that political Islam is the 
only alternative to dictatorship.  
Will the Egyptian uprising translate into a transition to democracy? Today’s 
journals assess the Egyptian uprisings as incomplete, uncertain and unpredictable. 
However, regime change is a long process and the events in Egypt are still unfolding.  
Transitions to democracy are always difficult processes. This is especially the case 
when a civil war or a counterrevolution arises, as is happening in Libya. It may also 
encounter obstacles and disappointment despite the success of the uprising. Thus, it 
may be a matter of many years before we recognize if a democratization process has 
occurred and the region has become more democratic and peaceful.  
Looking to history, revolutions seldom produce the egalitarian democratic 
free societies the people hope for. Will the future in Egypt resemble the French 
Revolution that led to the great terror, the Russian Revolution managed by Stalin or 
the Iranian Revolution that led to Ayatollah Khomeini? Will it take the path of Latin 
American and East European countries still managing their post revolutionaries’ 
traumas?  Or will it end up producing the most democratic country in the Middle 
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East? Only time will tell how the transition in Egypt proceeds. 
In Egypt, Islamists, the military, conservatives and reformers are struggling 
for power. John Goldstone (2011) predicts long abrupt government turnovers and 
policy reversals similar to what happened in the Philippines. Goldstone points out 
that all authoritarian regimes- including Haiti, Romania, the Philippines, Zaire, 
Indonesia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan- that collapsed in the last 30 years never 
succeeded by extremists. They are often subject to authoritarian tendencies, but not 
to an ideologically driven power. And this is reflective of the Egyptian situation.  
For many young Egyptians, especially the ones involved in the uprisings that 
toppled the Mubarak’s regime, the Morsi elections did not satisfy their hopes for a 
revolutionary president.  Millions protested for months yearning for fundamental 
reforms. Yet Morsi and his radical ideology spread fear and anxiety in the hearts of 
the Egyptians youth.  
Egypt’s youth hold the responsibility to devise institutional mechanisms that 
allows for accountability.  The first exercise of this fundamental power was initiated 
in the streets through protests, demonstrations and informal gatherings. However, to 
achieve a democratic transition, formal and institutional processes are of a necessity 
to achieve reforms and important constitutional transformations. In other words, 
young Egyptians together with their new president should work on a constitutional 
mode of democratic governance in order to achieve a successful transition towards 
democracy.    
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